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CONTEXTUALIZING REGIMES: 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AS A RESPONSE TO 
THE LIMITS OF INTERPRETATION AND 
POLICY ENGINEERING 
Charles F. Sabel* 
William H. Simon** 
When legal language and the effects of public intervention are indetermi-
nate, generalist lawmakers (legislatures, courts, top-level administrators) 
often rely on the normative output of contextualizing regimes—institutions 
that structure deliberative engagement by stakeholders and articulate the 
resulting understanding. Examples include the familiar practices of dele-
gation and deference to administrative agencies in public law and to trade 
associations in private law. We argue that resorting to contextualizing re-
gimes is becoming increasingly common across a broad range of issues 
and that the structure of emerging regimes is evolving away from the well-
studied agency and trade association examples. The newer regimes mix 
public and private participation in novel ways. Their structures are less 
hierarchical than those of traditional administrative agencies and less 
clearly bounded than those of traditional trade associations. While the tra-
ditional regimes function to make solutions developed in more specialized 
realms available to generalist lawmakers, the newer ones function to or-
ganize collaborative inquiry where neither specialists nor generalists have 
well-developed understandings of problems or solutions. We explore the 
structure of such regimes and their relation to generalist lawmakers 
through three examples—a health and safety regime that straddles private 
and public law (the California Leafy Greens Products Handler Marketing 
Agreement), a civil rights regime (the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Ini-
tiative), and an international environmental regime (the Dolphin 
Conservation Program of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission). 
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Introduction 
As portrayed in legal scholarship and the law school curriculum, legal 
decisionmaking is fundamentally a matter of interpretation or policy engi-
neering. In either approach, a disinterested official (or a lawyer trying to 
anticipate her decision) reasons analytically from given premises or goals to 
a specific solution. Lawyers differ about how interpretation and policy engi-
neering should be conducted and about when one or the other is appropriate, 
but their views converge in seeing law as elaborated primarily through these 
two ways of making decisions. 
This Article explores another approach to legal decisionmaking—
contextualizing regimes. In this approach, instead of making the decision 
directly, the officials charged with decisionmaking adopt the normative out-
put of one or more specialized bodies of stakeholders. The stakeholder 
regime may form independently of official intervention or it may be in-
duced, facilitated, or influenced by it. Either way, this approach to 
decisionmaking differs from interpretation and policy engineering in two 
respects. First, key decisions of the officials with primary responsibility tend 
to be indirect or procedural; they focus on the adequacy of the contextualiz-
ing regime rather than the substantive merits of the controversy. Second, 
decisionmaking within the contextualizing regime does not take the form 
only or even primarily of interpretive elaboration or instrumental effectua-
tion of given premises or goals. It involves dialogic reconciliation of diverse 
views among stakeholders about premises or goals on the one hand and 
conclusions or means on the other, and in the particular kind of contextual-
izing regime that most interests us, decisionmaking is preoccupied with 
discovery and experiment. 
We argue that the importance of contextualizing regimes has grown rap-
idly in recent years and that the phenomenon deserves a more prominent 
place than it has in legal theory and scholarship. Contextualizing regimes 
are a response to ignorance or uncertainty: the decisionmakers with primary 
authority defer to contextualizing regimes rather than make the decision 
directly because of one or more of three disadvantages. They do not know 
what the correct specific norm is. They believe that the correct specific norm 
is likely to change between the time they promulgate a decision and the time 
they will be able to revise it. Or they believe that what the correct specific 
norm is will vary across a broad range of local contexts about which they 
have little information. The increased pace of technological and economic 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2034501
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change, globalization, and the intensification of demands to accommodate 
diversity both within and across nations all generate such conditions, and 
such conditions generate contextualizing regimes. 
Our analysis builds on and generalizes from some familiar reference 
points. It is a commonplace observation that legislatures delegate and courts 
defer to administrative agencies.1 Moreover, a rich body of private law 
scholarship describes the role of trade associations in elaborating and en-
forcing industry-specific commercial norms.2 We emphasize the parallel 
roles of such public agencies and private associations in the elaboration of 
indeterminate legal norms. However, our central aim is to document and 
argue for the importance of a different regime structure than those portrayed 
in most discussions of agencies and trade associations. 
The emergent contextualizing regimes of recent years are typically a 
mixture of public and private actors and institutions. They engage a diverse 
variety of participants, and their boundaries are often porous and ambigu-
ous. These regimes do not have the top-down, command-and-control 
structure associated with New Deal regulation and sometimes presupposed 
in modern administrative law doctrine. Neither do they arise spontaneously 
through independent private initiative, like the institutions portrayed in the 
trade association literature. Moreover, the process of norm elaboration in 
contextualizing regimes is not adequately described as the derivation of 
rules from an established body of scientific knowledge (the conventional 
view of agencies) or the application of customary understanding (the con-
ventional trade association view).  
In the New Deal agency vision and the contemporary trade association 
vision, generalist lawmakers (legislatures, courts, top-level administrators) 
defer to experts or private associations because the generalists have a limited 
understanding of how to solve the problems at hand. However, these visions 
assume that, within the relevant discipline or industry, the problems can be 
solved through the application or elaboration of established understanding 
or practices. By contrast, the regimes on which we focus arise from prob-
lems that cannot be solved by applying established knowledge. The official 
decisionmakers’ disadvantage is not ignorance of some solution known to 
insiders of a more specialized institution, but an uncertainty shared by both 
generalists and insiders about what the solution might be.3  
Participants in regimes that respond to uncertainty, in this sense, are 
more likely to see their efforts as the joint exploration of possibilities and re-
interpretation of premises and goals in the light of what is discovered than 
as the elaboration of established knowledge. This newer-style contextualiz-
ing regime has been described in recent scholarship on “public law 
                                                                                                                      
 1. E.g., Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 2. E.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating 
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724 (2001). 
 3. On the distinction between ignorance and uncertainty, see, e.g., Frank H. Knight, 
Risk, Uncertainty and Profit 19–20, 224–32 (1921). 
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litigation” and “new governance” regulation, and it is perhaps most familiar 
in the literature on international organizations.4 Our account generalizes 
across these studies and argues that the phenomenon of contextualizing re-
gimes is more pervasive than they often suggest.  
The argument proceeds as follows. In Part I, we illustrate the predictably 
unfortunate results when generalist lawmakers insist on interpretive or poli-
cy-engineering strategies in situations that call for contextualizing regimes. 
Part II elaborates on the idea of a contextualizing regime in three widely 
varied policy contexts. In commercial law, we illustrate the contrast between 
the trade association regimes emphasized in recent scholarship and the new-
er type by considering, first, the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act 
reparations process and, second, the California Leafy Greens Products Han-
dler Marketing Agreement. We then examine a regime established in a civil 
rights context—the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative associated 
with the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act. Lastly, we con-
sider a regime that has emerged in international environmental protection—
the Dolphin Conservation Program of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna 
Commission. In Part III, we discuss the common structural features of the 
newer type of contextualizing regime. 
I. The Need for Contextualizing Regimes 
Contextualizing regimes arise when uncertainty about the practical ap-
plication of legal language or the effects of public intervention blocks 
conventional legal analysis. However, lawyers and judges wedded to tradi-
tional notions of legality sometimes find it hard to acknowledge when they 
are blocked. Here is an example: 
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of the practice of admitting at a criminal trial, without ac-
companying oral testimony, a chemical analyst’s written report certifying 
that a substance found in the defendant’s possession was an illegal drug (in 
this case, cocaine).5 The petitioner argued that the practice violated the Con-
frontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Three liberal justices joined 
Justices Scalia and Thomas to hold that the right of confrontation meant that 
the prosecution had to present the analyst as a live witness, even when the 
defendant had made no effort to pursue discovery about the evidence or to 
subpoena the analyst. 
The majority opinion emphasized interpretation. The Sixth Amendment 
says that criminal defendants “shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with 
                                                                                                                      
 4. E.g., Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compli-
ance with International Regulatory Agreements (1995); Law and New 
Governance in the EU and the US (Grainne de Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006); Jody 
Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1997); 
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation 
Proceeds, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1015 (2004). 
 5. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009); accord Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2713 
(2011) (affirming and elaborating Melendez-Diaz). 
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the witnesses against them.”6 Viewed in abstraction, the text provides scant 
guidance. The author of a document offered into evidence is not necessarily 
a “witness.” As Justice Scalia acknowledged in an earlier case, “One could 
plausibly read ‘witnesses against’ a defendant to mean those who actually 
testify at trial . . . , those whose statements are offered at trial . . . , or some-
thing in between . . . .”7 Moreover, even if the Sixth Amendment created a 
right of confrontation with respect to the author of the document, nothing in 
the text suggests that this right could not be satisfied by an opportunity to 
subpoena the witness. 
The majority looked to history to resolve the ambiguity. An obvious dif-
ficulty with this tack is that it has long been assumed that the Confrontation 
Clause is compatible with traditional hearsay exceptions for business and 
public records. The question thus arises whether the analyst’s certification is 
more like a percipient witness’s report of the defendant’s conduct, where 
there is a confrontation right, or a business or public record, where there is 
no such right. The majority argued that the certification is more like a report 
of conduct because it is “testimonial”—that is, the declarant expects her 
statement to be used at trial to adjudicate guilt.8 The dissent concluded that 
the chemical report is more like a business or public record because it re-
ports about a routine technical process, rather than the defendant’s conduct.9 
The alternative policy-engineering approach to these issues would dis-
cern the general goals of the Confrontation Clause and assess whether the 
Massachusetts statute was likely to frustrate these goals. For some years, the 
Court took such an approach in Confrontation Clause cases. In Ohio v. Rob-
erts, the Court suggested that hard cases should be resolved by an inquiry 
into whether the evidence was accompanied by adequate “particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness”10 or, as the Court later put it, adequate “indi-
cia of reliability.”11 However, in 2004, Crawford v. Washington purported to 
repudiate this approach. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Scalia ex-
plained, “Reliability is an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept.”12 
Crawford insisted that the scope of the Confrontation Clause be settled on 
interpretive grounds. 
No one in Melendez-Diaz disputed directly Crawford’s rejection of the 
instrumental perspective. On the other hand, both sides asserted instrumen-
tal concerns emphatically. Justice Scalia argued that there was a significant 
propensity to commit errors in scientific evidence and cited recent high-
profile scandals involving large-scale incompetence or fraud in forensic  
laboratories. The dissenters argued that forcing the prosecution routinely to 
                                                                                                                      
 6. U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
 7. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42–43 (2004) (citations omitted). 
 8. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531–34. 
 9. Id. at 2550–51 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 10. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. 
 11. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42.  
 12. Id. at 63. The tortuous doctrinal background of these cases is critically reviewed in 
David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 39–44.  
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present a live witness to testify to the analysis would be of little value in 
checking such problems. They also insisted that the holding would be highly 
disruptive to the trial process, in part because it might take many witnesses 
to describe the analytical process without resorting to testimonial hearsay. 
Justice Scalia dismissed these concerns, noting that few criminal cases reach 
trial and speculating that, in many of those that do, defendants would waive 
their right to confront the analysts. 
Melendez-Diaz exemplifies the limits of interpretation or at least the nar-
rowly interpretive strategy of textualism. The principal virtue claimed for 
textualism—determinacy—comes at the cost of arbitrariness in terms of the 
practical vindication of relevant values. If interpretation indicates that the 
Confrontation Clause entails some practice that does not serve any plausible 
public goal, the fact that it does so clearly is at best a limited advantage. In 
fact, there does not seem to be any determinacy payoff at all to textualism in 
Melendez-Diaz. There is at least as much disagreement about the semantics 
and history of the Confrontation Clause as there is about the practical effects 
of alternative rulings. 
But the problems of the policy or “reliability” approach are also undeni-
ably severe. The judges could not even agree on the likely impact of their 
decision on judicial resources, much less on the reliability of scientific evi-
dence under the Massachusetts practice. From the point of view of 
“guarantees of trustworthiness,”13 scientific evidence is fundamentally dif-
ferent from traditional percipient-witness testimony. Scientific evidence is 
generated by a process in which many people participate. With respect to 
drug identification, the process begins with the collection, packaging, and 
transportation of a substance. It continues through the decisions as to what 
portions of the substance to test (if there are large quantities, sampling will 
have to be used), what drug identities to test for, and—because there are 
multiple tests for most kinds of drugs—what tests to use. It then involves the 
preparation of the substance for testing and the application of mechanical 
and/or chemical processes. These processes typically produce results that 
require interpretation. For example, a machine may produce a graph of the 
composition of the tested sample that is compared to standard representa-
tions of drugs. Finally, a document reports the conclusion of this process.14 
Examination or cross-examination of the veracity, perception, and ex-
pertise of any one participant in this process may not yield significant 
insight into the reliability of the conclusion. The conclusion depends on all 
of them. Moreover, it depends not only on their individual veracity, percep-
                                                                                                                      
 13. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66). 
 14. Erin Murphy argues that “second generation” scientific evidence, such as DNA 
identification, is even more removed from traditional percipient witness testimony than “first 
generation” scientific evidence, such as fingerprint identification. First-generation evidence 
often focuses around a complex judgment made by a single analyst, whereas the responsibility 
for second-generation evidence is more diffused and more dependent on centrally developed 
protocols, software, and databases. Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False 
Certainty, and the Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 721, 726–30 
(2007). 
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tion, and expertise, but also on the rules by which they collaborate. It further 
depends on the quality of the rules and information embodied in the ma-
chines, software, and databases on which they rely. 
Given these circumstances, both the majority and the dissent in Melen-
dez-Diaz are partly right about the decision’s likely practical effect. As the 
dissent suggested, cross-examination at trial often could make a serious con-
tribution to protecting against misleading evidence only if it involved 
extensive disruption, forcing agents at various stages of the process to testi-
fy.15 But Justice Scalia may be right to have suggested that the decision will 
have little impact of any kind. States will find an acceptable procedure that 
induces defendants to waive these rights, as they have with other procedural 
rights the Court has given defendants.16  
For these judges then, the Constitution has little or nothing to say about 
what they all acknowledge is a critical problem of reliability with scientific 
evidence. The majority felt compelled by (its tendentious interpretation of) 
language and history to adopt the anachronistic and ineffective remedy of 
requiring routine oral testimony at trial. The dissent, recognizing that this 
remedy will be ineffective and perhaps unable to imagine a better one, pre-
ferred to leave the problem alone. 
Outside the courts, the most salient response to the problem of forensic 
evidence is an accreditation regime. In such a regime, a central organization 
sets provisional general standards, demands that local units implement them 
with contextualized plans, audits the local units, facilitates the exchange of 
information among the local units and the continuous updating of standards, 
and publicizes information in a way that stigmatizes bad performance.  
At least part of such a structure was in place for the kind of forensic evi-
dence involved in Melendez-Diaz. The federal government sponsors a 
Scientific Working Group for the Analysis of Seized Drugs and parallel 
groups for analysis of gunshot, hair and fiber, fingerprint, and DNA evi-
dence. Each group promulgates and regularly updates protocols and 
standards. The federally supported American Society of Crime Laboratory 
Directors (“ASCLD”) has organized an independent Accreditation Board. 
The Board’s standards adapt to the forensic field the International Organiza-
tion for Standardization’s General Requirements for the Competence of 
Testing and Calibration Laboratories, which are widely used in the private 
                                                                                                                      
 15. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2547–55 (2009) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
 16. In Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2011), the majority suggested 
that a “notice-and-demand” procedure would satisfy the Constitution. Under such a procedure, 
if the prosecution gives notice of intent to offer a forensic report, the defendant must make an 
affirmative demand for live testimony of an analyst or the right is waived. The court noted that 
“analysts testify in only a very small percentage of cases . . . for it is unlikely that defense 
counsel will insist on live testimony whose effect will be merely to highlight rather than cast 
doubt upon the forensic analysis.” Id. at 2718–19 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). But see id. at 2728 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“There is in the ordinary case . . . no 
good reason for defense counsel to waive the right of confrontation as the Court now interprets 
it.”). 
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sector. Seventy-eight percent of publicly funded crime laboratories are ac-
credited by the ASCLD Board.17 
The accreditation process involves extensive self-reporting and selective 
audit verification of the reports and “proficiency” testing in which individu-
als and groups must identify test samples. Laboratories are supposed to have 
their own Quality Assurance processes, and accreditation reviewers assess 
the adequacy of these internal processes. The standards recommend initial 
certification and periodic recertification of laboratories on the basis of clas-
ses and tests of various kinds. 
A recent National Research Council report views the ASCLD process 
favorably, but suggests that it is too fragmented and underfunded. The 
Council’s strongest criticism is that laboratory accreditation and analyst cer-
tification are voluntary.18 Another plausible critique of this structure is that it 
is too dominated by forensic professionals and thus vulnerable to the im-
pulses of mutual self-protection often found in self-regulated organizations. 
Transparency that facilitates public criticism and judicial assessment might 
be responsive to this concern. But an important role could also be played by 
the defense bar. As Erin Murphy has pointed out, if defense lawyers are to 
play a role in ensuring the reliability of forensic evidence, they will need 
extensive and ongoing training.19 Moreover, given the limitations of chal-
lenges at trial as a check on systemic malfunctions, it would make sense to 
incorporate defense lawyers into the processes of ongoing systemic review, 
such as accreditation. 
The possibility of an improved contextualizing regime suggests that 
there was an alternative in Melendez-Diaz to the tendentious semanticizing 
of the majority on the one hand and “a mere judicial determination of relia-
bility” (Scalia’s characterization of Ohio v. Roberts) on the other.20 The 
Court could have insisted on guarantees of reliability as a condition of ad-
mission of forensic evidence without undertaking to define those guarantees 
itself. A documentary report should be admissible if it is certified by a la-
boratory in good standing in a minimally adequate contextualizing regime, 
if the report itself meets the reporting standards of the regime, and if the 
report asserts that the test results were derived in accordance with the re-
gime’s processing standards. 
                                                                                                                      
 17. Nat’l Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United 
States: A Path Forward 199–200 (2009). On accreditation in general, see id. at 193–215. 
 18. See id. at 195–200, 215. 
 19. Murphy, supra note 14, at 776. Research confirms this point. Garrett and Neufield 
reviewed 137 transcripts of convicted defendants who were later exonerated and found that 
“invalid” forensic evidence played a role in eighty-two of the wrongful convictions. Brandon 
L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 
95 Va. L. Rev. 1, 12–14 (2009). The problem, however, was not hearsay. All the cases in-
volved live forensic testimony. Id. at 13. Yet “[d]efense counsel rarely cross-examined analysts 
concerning invalid testimony and rarely obtained experts on their own.” Id. at 2. 
 20. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004). 
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Of course, this approach requires the Court to give some meaning to the 
notion of a “minimally adequate contextualizing regime.” There is no reason 
to think this task beyond the Court. 
First, the Court does not need to define an adequate regime all at once, 
or indeed, ever. It can simply give examples, as it encounters them in cases, 
of patently inadequate regimes. The Massachusetts regime in Melendez-
Diaz seems patently inadequate in two respects. The state laboratory  
involved was not accredited “by an[y] external certification body for pur-
poses of forensic testing.”21 Moreover, the “certificates of analysis” offered 
in evidence disclosed nothing other than that seized bags had “been exam-
ined with the following results: The substance was found to contain: 
Cocaine.”22 Lack of uniform reporting standards is a major deficiency of the 
present regime, but it seems unlikely that there would be much dispute that 
this report was inadequate. There appears to be consensus that “laboratory 
reports . . . should describe, at a minimum, methods and materials, proce-
dures, results, and conclusions, and they should identify, as appropriate, the 
sources of uncertainty in the procedures and conclusions along with esti-
mates of their scale (to indicate the level of confidence in the results).”23  
Second, judicial judgments about the adequacy of a contextualizing re-
gime would be a lot like the judgments that the Supreme Court has already 
committed the federal judiciary to make with respect to scientific testimony 
under the Daubert interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence.24 Daub-
ert requires, as a condition of admissibility, a judicial determination that 
scientific evidence is “reliable.”25 This reliability determination is supposed 
to include considerations of whether the theory and techniques on which the 
testimony is based have been validated, subjected to peer review and publi-
cation, governed by generally accepted standards, have an established error 
rate, and are widely accepted in the scientific community.26 Clearly, this in-
quiry extensively overlaps with the assessment of the contextualizing regime 
for forensic laboratories. 
Indeed, in the federal courts, proposals for policing the adequacy of fo-
rensic evidence might be developed subconstitutionally through Daubert 
and the rules of evidence. But while interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause cannot yield a specific set of practice standards, it does suggest that 
the reliability of scientific evidence is a matter of constitutional concern and 
that the federal courts have a role in holding the states accountable. The 
                                                                                                                      
 21. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) 
(No. 07-591) (alternation in original) (quoting a Massachusetts Department of Health official) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 22. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531. 
 23. Nat’l Research Council, supra note 17, at 186. 
 24. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588–95 (1993). 
 25. Id. at 589. 
 26. Id. at 593–94. 
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most plausible way for the Court to vindicate this concern is through en-
couraging and policing a contextualizing regime.27 
II. The Emergence of Contextualizing Regimes 
The minimum structure of a contextualizing regime involves a set of lo-
cal units, united by relations to a set of products, services, and associated 
problems, and a center. The local units are related horizontally by virtue of 
similar functions or outputs, or vertically by virtue of different positions in a 
supply chain or production process for a particular output. The center per-
forms key coordination and governance functions, including the facilitation 
of mutual learning and the contextualized elaboration of norms. Our main 
claim is that contextualizing regimes arise in substantial part as a response 
to the inadequacy of interpretation and policy engineering in situations of 
uncertainty. 
A. Background: Hart and Sacks’s Case of the Spoiled Cantaloupes 
Although particular contextualizing regimes are well-known, there have 
been few recent efforts to analyze the general phenomenon. Indeed, the 
most useful starting point for a general account remains Henry Hart and Al-
bert Sacks’s 1958 work The Legal Process.28  
The first and longest of the case studies featured in the book was “The 
Case of the Spoiled Cantaloupes.” In 1943, through a series of telegrams, a 
Chicago broker sold a railroad carload of cantaloupes en route from Yuma, 
Arizona, to a Springfield, Massachusetts, wholesaler specifying “rolling 
acceptance final.” When the cantaloupes arrived in Springfield, they were 
extensively spoiled and did not satisfy the contractual specification of “U.S. 
No. 1 cantaloupes.” The spoilage resulted from Cladosporium Rot, a disease 
“of field origin” that was latent but perhaps not observable at the time of 
shipment.29 The wholesaler sent a notice of rejection and abandoned the 
cantaloupes at the loading dock in Springfield, from where the railroad 
                                                                                                                      
 27. The idea that constitutional criminal defense rights might be elaborated incremen-
tally and experimentally is not novel. For example, Henry Monaghan pointed out some time 
ago that the Court’s explanation of the exclusionary rule shifted after Mapp v. Ohio from the 
claim that exclusion was entailed interpretively by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to an 
instrumental claim that it was necessary to deter violations of the values underlying these 
Amendments. Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional 
Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 4–9 (1975). He then argued that, from an instrumental 
rationale, the Court could not plausibly assume that exclusion would always and invariably be 
necessary. See id. at 9. It follows from the instrumental view that the states should be free to 
try alternatives, and the Court should respect their efforts as long as they appear “minimally 
satisfactory.” See id. For a comprehensive critique and set of proposals along such lines, see 
William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 780 
(2006).  
 28. Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process (William N. 
Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., Found. Press tent. ed. 1958).  
 29. Id. at 10–11. 
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eventually disposed of them for salvage value. The broker sued for the con-
tract price.30  
Hart and Sacks entitle this chapter “The Significance of an Institutional 
System.” Their most general and basic point is that the case cannot be effec-
tively resolved by doctrine as taught in law schools and elaborated in 
treatises, but requires a set of institutions configured to the industry. This 
lesson rests on a series of more specific ones. 
First, there is the realist lesson of the indeterminacy of doctrine. Hart 
and Sacks show that the general law of sales is ambiguous as to whether, in 
this situation, the seller’s shipment of nonconforming goods permits the 
buyer to reject the goods, instead of accepting and claiming damages for 
their reduced value. They proceed to point out that, if we had concluded that 
there was a right to reject, there would remain the question of whether a 
rejecting buyer has a duty to assist the seller by disposing of the spoiled 
goods. And after those questions are answered, a court might still have to 
answer the further question of whether the buyer’s failure to salvage or his 
wrongful rejection leads to offsetting damages or a complete forfeiture of 
his defense.31 The resources of general contract law are inadequate to re-
solve these questions. 
A second lesson is the importance of context. The cantaloupes dispute is 
not simply a contract case; it is a case about the interstate exchange of per-
ishable agricultural products. Assessment must take account of “[t]he 
practices, attitudes, and expectations . . . of members of the industry.”32 In 
particular, it must pay attention to “the rejection evil.” When prices fall, 
buyers may seek to escape their commitments by seizing minor noncon-
formities as excuses to reject. Small shippers may have limited ability to 
dispose of rejected goods or to pursue litigation in distant locales. What is 
needed in this context is “a better means of preventing abuses from occur-
ring, and of discouraging unscrupulous dealers from taking advantage of 
reluctance to litigate.”33 Such considerations encourage us to consider 
whether interpretations that give broad latitude to reject or that do not penal-
ize failure to salvage may exacerbate the rejection problem. 
The third lesson Hart and Sacks draw is the need to adapt to new cir-
cumstances.34 This case was eventually resolved in favor of the seller. Hart 
and Sacks approve of that decision, but they conclude by noting later cases 
in which courts plausibly decided not to apply the forfeiture result. In these 
later cases, it appeared that the seller misrepresented the condition of the 
goods or unilaterally altered the terms of the sale after the goods had 
shipped. Hart and Sacks portray these decisions sympathetically, suggesting 
that to apply the forfeiture rule where there was evidence of opportunism on 
                                                                                                                      
 30. Id. at 45–46. 
 31. See id. at 11. 
 32. Id. at 9. 
 33. Id. at 40. 
 34. Id. at 64–66. 
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the seller’s part would shift the balance of vulnerability too far toward the 
buyer. 
These lessons lead to a final one—the importance of institutional struc-
ture.35 The courts and other actors with responsibility for resolving the 
dispute need to understand that they and the dispute are embedded in struc-
tures of roles and responsibilities. A regime has developed in response to the 
distinctive problems of interstate trade in perishable fruits and vegetables. 
The preeminent player is the United States Department of Agriculture, and 
the normative keystone is the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act 
(“PACA”), which makes it a violation of federal law for “any dealer to reject 
or fail to deliver . . . without reasonable cause any perishable agricultural 
commodity” in an interstate transaction.36 Congress enacted the statute in 
1930 in part as a response to “the rejection evil.”37 The Act instructs the Sec-
retary of Agriculture to operate an arbitration process that reduces the cost 
of adjudicating claims and to administer a licensing scheme designed to 
screen irresponsible buyers and sellers from the industry.38  
Another important element of the regime is a set of regulations promul-
gated by the Department to guide the interpretation of undefined contract 
terms like “U.S. No. 1 cantaloupes” and “rolling acceptance final.” (“U.S. 
No. 1 cantaloupes” requires, among other things, that not more than one 
percent of the shipment be “affected by soft rot,” while “rolling acceptance 
final” entails, among other things, that the buyer “has no right of rejection 
on arrival.”)39 In addition, the Department operates an inspection service at 
major shipping terminals that makes it feasible to prove the condition of 
goods at pertinent times.40  
Although extensive, the Department’s activities are part of a still larger 
structure. State commercial law continues to play a background role, filling 
the interstices of federal authority. Private industry associations facilitate 
enforcement of the Secretary’s orders by publicizing noncompliance and 
mobilizing informal industry pressures against repeat offenders. Moreover, 
industry groups play an important role in the Department’s formulation of 
its regulations on default contract terms. The Department actively consults 
trade associations and, in some cases, it incorporates norms they have previ-
ously enacted for their members.41  
Hart and Sacks are centrally concerned with the relation of courts to 
contextualizing regimes, and especially to agencies. The cantaloupes case 
came to the courts in an action for review of a decision by a Department of 
                                                                                                                      
 35. See Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 875 (2003) (discussing and applying Hart and Sacks’s institutionalism to questions of 
public law indeterminacy). Our ideas have been strongly influenced by discussions with Dorf. 
 36. Hart & Sacks, supra note 28, at 33–34. 
 37. Id. at 40. 
 38. Id. at 33–34. 
 39. Id. at 18 n.10 (discussing several since-repealed provisions of 7 C.F.R.). 
 40. Id. at 11. 
 41. Id. at 41–42, 44. 
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Agriculture hearing officer in a PACA arbitration.42 Treating the case in 
terms of the general law of sales, the district court held that the buyer could 
offset the reduction in value caused by the cantaloupes’ nonconformity 
against the seller’s claim for the purchase price. However, this decision was 
ultimately reversed by the appellate court on the ground that the buyer had 
forfeited his defense by failing to salvage.  
Hart and Sacks defend the forfeiture resolution as the response devel-
oped for this situation by the Department of Agriculture, who they deem and 
think the courts should defer to as, the institutional actor best qualified to 
address it. Yet, they suggest deference should be conditioned on the agency 
providing a clear, minimally plausible explanation of its decision. Moreover, 
they point to cases where the courts could properly take the lead role instead 
of deferring to the Secretary. They approve of decisions in which the courts 
overrule the Secretary in order to protect buyers from seller fraud or sharp 
practice, suggesting (debatably) that the courts’ expertise is superior in mat-
ters involving basic fairness.43  
The PACA regime differs from the ones described in the contemporary 
literature on trade associations in that it is not a predominantly private re-
gime. Hart and Sacks argue that public intervention was necessary because 
the industry had not been able to produce a regime on its own to solve “the 
rejection evil” and related problems.44 As it develops, the PACA regime 
combines “private decisions and official decisions” in ways that exhibit “el-
ements of a chicken-and-egg relationship” that “def[ies] any facile 
description.”45  
On the other hand, the PACA structure does resemble the trade-
association-focused regimes in its preoccupation with dispute resolution. 
Like the trade association regimes, PACA is focused on providing default 
terms for contracts and arbitration of claims. It is primarily designed to fa-
cilitate bilateral exchange. The norms it generates are stable and customary. 
The newer regimes to which we turn now resemble Hart and Sacks’s ac-
count in their complex mingling of public and private. But they depart from 
both PACA and the traditional trade association regimes in two central 
ways. First, their concerns are broader than dispute resolution and the gov-
ernance of intra-industry exchange. They embrace core aspects of the 
industry’s production processes. Second, their norms are not customary. 
Norms are revised more or less continuously in response to new perceptions 
of risk and opportunity in unstable environments. Private actors engage in 
joint exploration of uncertainty, and public officials are less likely to  
                                                                                                                      
 42. Id. at 47–53. 
 43. Id. at 63–64.  
 44. Hart and Sacks seem to have discounted the possibility that private initiative can 
sometimes be sufficient, though the trade association scholarship shows that it can. See, e.g., 
Bernstein, supra note 2, at 1724–25 (discussing the cotton gin industry). The key determinants 
of the need for public intervention appear to be the number and heterogeneity of the stake-
holders. See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons 15–21, 182–85 (1990). 
 45. Hart & Sacks, supra note 28, at 8–9.  
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passively adopt their solutions than to encourage, shape, and collaborate 
with their efforts.  
B. The California Leafy Greens Products Handler Marketing Agreement 
The commercial law concerns Hart and Sacks emphasize converge with 
public safety concerns. A system parallel to PACA regulates food products 
to prevent adverse effects on health. At the federal level, there are two major 
safety regimes—one administered by the Department of Agriculture for 
meat and poultry, and one administered by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (“FDA”) for other foods. Statutes have long prohibited the sale of food 
that is “injurious to health”46 or “unsound, unhealthful, unwholesome, or 
otherwise unfit.”47 The Food Safety Modernization Act of 2010 gives the 
FDA the authority to shut down facilities producing food that “has a reason-
able probability of causing health problems.”48 
The difficulties of administrators and courts in elaborating such terms 
are analogous to the ones they face in elaborating contract terms such as 
those in the cantaloupe case. The response has also been analogous—the 
construction of contextualizing regimes.  
For more than a century, the most elaborate food safety programs have 
been those for meat and poultry run by the Department of Agriculture. Until 
recently, most unsafe meat and chicken could be detected by visual and ol-
factory inspection. Regulators practiced “poke and sniff” examination of 
each carcass.49 Because this kind of inspection was imperfect, they also reg-
ulated the equipment, structure, and practices of processing plants 
prophylactically in highly directive regulations. For example, regulations 
required that driveways leading to plants be paved, that poultry plants have 
thirty candles of light intensity on all working surfaces, and that water used 
to clean cutting equipment be at least 180 degrees Fahrenheit.50  
In the past two decades, this system has changed in response to two sorts 
of pressures. Increasingly, hazards have taken the form not of directly ob-
servable contamination but of micropathogens detectable only through 
chemical testing.51 Moreover, the processes that produce clean products are 
                                                                                                                      
 46. 21 U.S.C. §§ 342(a)(1), 601(m)(4) (2006). 
 47. Id. §§ 601(m)(3), 606(a) (defining “adulterated” and prohibiting adulterated meat 
respectively). 
 48. Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, § 102(b)(1), 124 Stat. 3885, 
3887 (2011) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 350d(b)(1) (2006)).  
 49. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Pre-
scribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & Soc’y Rev. 691, 696–98 
(2003). 
 50. Sanitation Requirements for Official Meat and Poultry Establishments, 62 Fed. Reg. 
45,045, 45,047–48 (Aug. 25, 1997) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 303, 308, 381, 416) (de-
scribing and repealing various highly directive regulations). 
 51. Hart and Sacks note as a potential problem that the Cladosporium Rot was not 
visible in its early stage. The problem was not intractable in the cantaloupes case because, 
since the disease was “of field origin,” its presence at the time of shipment—the relevant time 
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not well understood, uniform, or stable. In consequence, food safety regula-
tion has been shifting over the past two decades away from “command-and-
control”-style regulation toward “management-based regulation.”52  
In 1996, the Department of Agriculture rescinded much of the  
command-and-control structure for meat and poultry processing and inaugu-
rated a management-based approach known as Hazard Analysis and Critical  
Control Points (“HACCP”). The regulations now require the processors 
themselves to identify the risks of contamination and the “critical control 
points” where intervention can reduce these risks. They must then produce 
plans for minimizing the risks. The plans must provide for monitoring and 
corrective action in the event of failure, and they must also be updated in 
light of experience. In addition, the operator must be able to point to evi-
dence of the adequacy of the plan from research performed by the operator 
himself or by others. The regulators monitor plan adequacy and implemen-
tation. Performance is assessed by sample testing of indicator organisms. 
The indicator organisms—salmonella and generic E. coli (not the more toxic 
forms of E. coli such as O157: H7)—are relatively mild toxins likely to be 
destroyed by cooking and which would normally not themselves render the 
product unmarketable. They serve as indicators of the effectiveness of the 
process control. Facilities are ranked based on industry surveys. They must 
meet minimum thresholds to avoid regulatory intervention and, in principle, 
these thresholds increase as industry practice improves. The agency, trade 
associations, and consultants collect and disseminate information through-
out the industry so that firms can learn from each other’s experiences.53 
Until the recent Food Safety Modernization Act,54 no comparable federal 
requirements covered most other foods. However, some producers did not 
wait for the statute. The California Leafy Greens Products Handler Market-
ing Agreement is an especially interesting instance.55 Raw fruits and 
vegetables became an acutely salient concern after some highly publicized 
disease outbreaks from tainted spinach and lettuce in 2006.56 Because fruits 
and vegetables are often eaten raw, they are subject to special concern. Heat 
kills most micropathogens on cooked foods. Food poisoning outbreaks have 
                                                                                                                      
under applicable contract law—could be inferred from its discovery on arrival. Hart & 
Sacks, supra note 28, at 11. 
 52. See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 49, at 689 (describing “management-based” 
regulation). 
 53. In practice, implementation has been erratic. See Comm. on the Review of the 
Use of Scientific Criteria & Performance Standards for Safe Food, Nat’l Research 
Council, Scientific Criteria to Ensure Safe Food 140–41 (2003).  
 54. Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011). 
 55. State of Cal. Dep’t of Food & Agric., California Leafy Green Products 
Handler Marketing Agreement (effective as amended from Mar. 5, 2008) [hereinafter 
California Marketing Agreement], available at http://www.cdfa.ca.gov/mkt/mkt/pdf/ 
CA%20Leafy%20Green%20Products%20Handler%20Agreement.pdf 
 56. See generally Julie Schmit, All Bacteria May Not Come Out in the Wash, USA 
Today.com, Oct. 5, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/2006-10-04-
spinach-wash-usat_x.htm (discussing the 2006 outbreak and the special concerns with eating 
raw spinach). 
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been especially frequent with spinach and other leafy greens. These vegeta-
bles are produced in larger-scale operations than in the past and in new 
forms, like “salad mix,” that involve mingling pieces picked in different lo-
cations. By multiplying the number of “contact points,” these new 
conditions increase the likelihood that contamination will spread widely. 
Federal food regulation has focused traditionally on post-farm industrial 
processing. But for raw fruits and vegetables, most of the “critical control 
points” are on the farm. Further, the large number of farms and the way farm 
production, as compared to industrial processing, is spread over time and 
space present additional challenges for traditional regulatory approaches.  
In 2007, the FDA announced that it would not promulgate mandatory 
rules for processing of fruits and vegetables because there was too much 
uncertainty about the proper standards.57 Instead, it has encouraged and as-
sisted state and private efforts. Acting through a trade association, California 
producers petitioned the California Department of Food and Agriculture in 
2007 under a statute that authorizes the Department to enter marketing 
agreements to establish the California Leafy Greens Product Handler Mar-
keting Agreement (“LGMA”).58 LGMA membership consists of 
intermediaries who handle 18 specified leafy green vegetables. There are 
currently about 120 members, accounting for about 99 percent of California 
leafy green production (which in turn accounts for about 75 percent of na-
tional production).59  
LGMA is governed by a thirteen-member board. Board members are 
chosen by the state Secretary of Agriculture from nominations by the mem-
bership.60 Twelve must be representatives of the handler-members of the 
organization; the thirteenth is supposed to represent “the public.” The board 
designates safety standards or “best practices” for the farms from which the 
handlers buy. The handler-members commit to deal only with farms that 
comply with the standards. Inspectors from the California Department of 
Food and Agriculture monitor compliance. The LGMA board sanctions 
noncompliance by suspending or withdrawing a recalcitrant member’s right 
to use the LGMA service mark. The entire process is funded by assessments 
on LGMA members. The key benefit of membership in good standing is the 
right to use the LGMA service mark on the product and on bills of lading 
and other shipping documents. The mark seems to have some value to con-
sumers, but its most important function is as a certification to business 
                                                                                                                      
 57. Marian Burros, Government Offers Guidelines to Fresh-Food Industry, N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 13, 2007, at A17. The agency also pointed to insufficient enforcement resources. Id. 
 58. See About Us, Cal. Leafy Green Prods. Handler Mktg. Bd., 
www.caleafygreens.ca.gov/about-us (last visited Jan. 21, 2012); Cal. Food & Agric. Code 
§ 58745 (West 2012). 
 59. See Western Growers Ass’n, Justification for Proposed National Marketing Agree-
ment for Leafy Green Vegetables, available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ 
getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5077207. See generally Variun Shekhur, Produce Exception-
alism: Examining the Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement and Its Ability to Improve Food 
Safety, 6 J. Food L. & Pol’y 267 (2010). 
 60. California Marketing Agreement, supra note 55, art. III. 
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buyers of compliance with the standards. Many dealers bargain for LGMA-
compliant leafy greens, and Canada and Mexico forbid import of non-
LGMA-compliant California greens.61  
An important set of LGMA requirements concerns “trace-back.”62 Each 
handler must maintain records that permit identification of the farm and 
field from which the products it sells come in the event that contamination is 
discovered downstream in the supply chain. The rest of the requirements 
concern growing practices and product quality. For the most part, these 
“best practices” are taken from recommended guidelines developed by 4 
major trade associations under the auspices of the FDA. Like the other most 
prominent certification regimes, LGMA is based on HACCP principles. It 
has some specific directive rules. For example, planted areas should be at 
least 400 feet from any concentrated animal-feeding operations.63 But most 
of the standards prescribe planning, monitoring, and testing. Each grower 
must develop plans with respect to field configuration, water, soil amend-
ments, worker sanitation, and equipment cleanliness. A plan for equipment, 
for example, must provide for routine cleaning, periodic inspection, and 
intervention when inspection detects problems. Some testing requirements 
are specific. Water must be tested in accordance with specified protocols for 
generic E. coli at least once every 60 days, and the water must meet  
specified tolerances for contaminants. If it fails, then water use has to be 
suspended or modified while the cause is diagnosed and remedied, and a 
wider, more frequent testing regime kicks in. 
This regime develops the tendencies Hart and Sacks note in the canta-
loupes case. First, there is the problem of indeterminacy. The difficulty of 
defining hazards to health increases as those hazards multiply. When diffi-
culties of detection lead to prophylactic regulation of the production 
process, they increase still further. For decades, the regulators used policy 
analysis to prescribe the requirements of safe production. But as both  
                                                                                                                      
 61. Import Requirements for Leafy Green Vegetables from U.S. and California, Can. 
Food Inspection Agency (issued May 4, 2007, amended May 31, 2007), http:// 
www.inspection.gc.ca/english/fssa/frefra/safsal/califore.shtml; Mexico Opens Border to State 
Spinach, Cal. Farmer (Dec. 21, 2007), http://farmprogress.com/california-farmer/ 
story.aspx?s=14911&c=9.  
There are many certification regimes for other products, and there is even another major 
regime that includes leafy greens. This is the Safe Quality Food program sponsored by some 
major retailers, including Wal-Mart and McDonald’s. Codex Alimentarius Comm’n, 32d Ses-
sion, Jun. 29–Jul. 4, 2009, The Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards on the Food Chain 
and on Public Standard-Setting Processes, ALINORM 09/32/9D-Part II 4–5 (May 2009) (by 
Spencer Hensen & John Humphrey). 
 62. California Marketing Agreement, supra note 55, art. V. See generally, Cal. 
Leafy Green Prods. Handler Mktg. Bd., Commodity Specific Food Safety Guide-
lines for the Production and Harvest of Lettuce and Leafy Greens (Jul. 22, 2011) 
[hereinafter Food Safety Guidelines], available at http://www.caleafygreens.ca.gov/ 
sites/default/files/LGMA%20Accepted%20Food%20Safety%20Practices%207.22.11.pdf 
(containing various provisions that impose record-keeping requirements on signatory handlers 
for purposes of traceability). 
 63. Food Safety Guidelines, supra note 62, at 49. 400 feet is a minimum. Distance 
should reflect a series of “risk/mitigation” factors, such as the slope of the terrain. 
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technology and risks changed, they found themselves unable to keep up. 
Even in the face of public demand for regulation following the 2006 out-
breaks, the FDA felt compelled to decline to promulgate mandatory 
standards because of insufficient understanding of what the requirements of 
safety were.64 The move to “management-based regulation” here and else-
where is an acknowledgement of the limits of policy engineering. 
Second, as in the cantaloupes case, we see the importance of context. 
Most certification regime standards are based on “guidance” norms  
published by the FDA. The initial 1998 “guidance” consisted of  
recommendations for fruits and vegetables in general;65 in 2004, the FDA 
called for “commodity-specific and practice-specific” guidelines.66 “Com-
modity-specific” standards, such as those of LGMA, are now pervasive. 
HAACP-style regulation represents a more radical step toward contextual-
ization, tailoring safety precautions to the circumstances of individual farms 
or even fields. 
Some of the most prominent criticisms of LGMA and other major re-
gimes call for further contextualization, especially to accommodate small 
farmers. Critics argue that small farms often involve lower contamination 
risks than larger ones and that a regime more sensitive to variation in risk 
would impose less costly burdens on them. For example, one complaint is 
that the required barriers between planted areas and areas that might attract 
animals represent a major cost for many small farmers and are unnecessary 
where there are no “high-risk” animals (for example, cattle as opposed to 
deer).67 
Another dimension of contextualization involves the place of local pro-
duction in the broader supply chain. It is not always clear at what point in 
the supply chain contamination is introduced or at what point it can be most 
effectively mitigated. Thus, upstream and downstream producers may need 
to collaborate with and monitor each other. The emphasis on “trace-back” 
reflects this reality. In leafy greens, for example, regulations focus on the 
                                                                                                                      
 64. Burros, supra note 57. 
 65. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Guide to Minimize Microbial Food Safety Haz-
ards for Fresh Fruits and Vegetables (1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/ProduceandPlanProduct
s/UCM169112.pdf. 
 66. Produce Safety from Production to Consumption: 2004 Action Plan to Minimize 
Foodborne Illness Associated with Fresh Product Consumption, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. 
(Oct. 2004), http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/Product-SpecificInformation/FruitsVegetables 
Juices/FDAProduceSafetyActivities/ProduceSafetyActionPlan/UCM129487.htm. 
 67. See Testimony of Chris Blanchard, Owner, Rock Spring Farm (Iowa), to the U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric., Public Hearing in the Matter of Leafy Green Vegetables Handled in the Unit-
ed States 2337–56 (Oct. 6, 2009), available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ 
getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5080524 (stating that low levels of E. coli have been detected 
in deer feces). However, the LGMA guidelines do take account of some such factors. The 
guideline for land with “grazing domestic livestock” (as opposed to confined commercial 
livestock) is thirty feet (as opposed to 400 feet). Cal. Leafy Greens Mktg. Bd., Audit 
Checklist 2 (July 23, 2010), available at http://www.caleafygreens.ca.gov/sites/default/files/ 
Audit%20Checklist%20California%207-23-10.pdf. 
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growers, but the “handlers” are the locus of regulatory organization. While 
the growers can most efficiently mitigate the risk, the handlers, less numer-
ous and closer to the ultimate customer, can more credibly certify.68  
Third, as in the cantaloupes case, we see the need for ready adaptability. 
Contemporary food safety regimes are self-consciously experimental. They 
draw on the American tradition of government-supported agricultural sci-
ence that takes the form both of scientific research and of an “Extension 
Service” designed to make the practical applications of research widely 
available.69 In addition, they link to a more recent system of food-illness 
incident reporting that emphasizes prompt diagnosis and intervention. 
LGMA guidelines get reassessed at least annually, and whenever either new 
technical knowledge or incident reporting suggests problems or opportuni-
ties.70 
International trade norms intensify the need for adaptation. Treaties typ-
ically require that health and safety regulations with trade-restrictive effects 
be no stricter than necessary to accomplish their purposes, and they require 
nations, for trade purposes, to treat as sufficient compliance with compara-
bly effective regulations of exporting states. Such norms require that 
regulators continuously engage with their counterparts in trade-partner na-
tions.71 
Finally, the tendency of exchange relations to embed themselves in the 
kind of multilevel, multifarious institutional structure that Hart and Sacks 
have observed is strikingly confirmed in contemporary food safety efforts. 
Again, we see a collaboration of federal and state and public and private. 
Standards are produced at the national level primarily by trade associations 
but with some oversight by the FDA, which then publishes them as recom-
mendations. They are incorporated with modifications at the state level by a 
producer organization with some oversight by the state agency. They are 
enforced through monitoring by the state agency, pursuant to an agreement 
with the producer organization, and through sanctions applied by the pro-
ducer organization.72  
                                                                                                                      
 68. See Christophe Charlier & Egizio Valceschini, Coordination for Traceability in the 
Food Chain: A Critical Appraisal of European Regulation, 25 Eur. L. J. Econ. 1, 13–14 
(2008) (analyzing the coordination barriers to effective private trace-back monitoring and 
arguing that downstream actors are more likely to play the necessary leadership role in organ-
izing effective initiatives). 
 69. On publicly supported agricultural research and extension, see Daniel Carpenter, 
The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy 179–254 (2001). 
 70. Telephone Interview with Scott Horsfall, Chief Exec. Officer, Cal. Leafy Greens 
Prods. Handler Mktg. Agreement (June 25, 2010). 
 71. Kalypso Nicolaides & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Re-
gimes: Governance Without Global Government, 68 Law & Contemp. Probs., 263, 293–94 
(Summer 2005). 
 72. Public agency participation at both federal and state levels involves agriculture, 
public health, and environmental officials. Many food safety standards draw on or interact 
with environmental standards. For example, LGMA water standards incorporate standards 
promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean Water Act. Cal. 
Leafy Green Prods. Handler Mktg. Agreement, Appendix B: Technical Basis Document for 
Sabel & Simon FTP4 B.doc 3/22/2012 9:47 AM 
20 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 110:ppp 
State contract and tort law play a background role. Contracts at all stag-
es of the supply chain may require LGMA-compliant product. And LGMA 
standards will likely be treated as relevant in defining the standard of care in 
tort suits by injured consumers.  
There is also an international dimension. We have noted that trade trea-
ties require regulators to engage with peers in trade-partner nations over the 
trade-restrictive effects of regulation. The key treaty covering food safety 
regulation—the Sanitary Phytosanitary (“SPS”) Agreement of the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”)—requires that signing nations base their regu-
lations on international standards unless the standards are inadequate to 
national regulatory purposes.73 The United Nations-sponsored Codex Ali-
mentarius Commission is the most important of several intergovernmental 
organizations that set food safety standards. Among the private international 
standard-setting and certification regimes is GlobalGAP (for “good agricul-
tural practices”), an organization formed by major European retailers. 
Another private international organization, the Global Food Safety Initiative, 
assesses certification regimes in accordance with a set of metastandards. 
Once a certification regime has itself been certified at this level, buyers who 
have previously decided to accept any of the other approved certifications 
should be willing to accept it.74 
The Food Safety Modernization Act passed at the end of 2010 affirms 
and strengthens the tendencies reflected in HAACP and LGMA.75 It man-
dates registration of food processing facilities by the FDA in a 
“management-based” approach. Facilities must develop, implement, moni-
tor, validate, and update HACCP plans (now called “Hazard Analysis and 
Preventive Control”). The FDA inspects and suspends registration on the 
basis of risk assessments. Among the specified risk factors are the adequacy 
of a facility’s plan and its implementation and whether the facility has been 
certified by a private auditor that is in good standing under an accreditation 
regime. With respect to imports, the Act encourages private international 
certification regimes by allowing importers to rely on certification in dis-
charging their duties to verify safety and by expediting the import process 
for certified goods. The FDA is charged with operating a meta-accreditation 
process for third-party accreditors.  
The Act provides for the FDA to set standards for fruits and vegetables. 
It seems clear that such standards will be developed in a way that relies on 
                                                                                                                      
Commodity Specific Food Safety Guidelines for the Lettuce and Leafy Greens Supply Chain 
2nd Edition 2-4 (Apr. 18, 2007), http://www.caleafygreens.ca.gov/sites/default/files/ 
appendix_b_technical_basis.pdf. Some LGMA standards create tensions with environmen-
tal ones that require negotiation. For example, settling ponds that filter sediment improve 
water quality but attract animals that might contaminate nearby crops. 
 73. WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 
15, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493. See generally Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement 
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 41–75 (2007). 
 74. See generally Codex Alimentarius Comm’n, supra note 61. 
 75. Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, §§ 102–05, 201–05, 301–07, 
124 Stat. 3885–905, 3923–39, 3953–66 (2011). 
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organizations like LGMA. In anticipation of the Act, the FDA and the De-
partment of Agriculture jointly announced in the fall of 2010 a Produce 
Safety Alliance based at Cornell University that will include federal and 
state agencies, universities, and trade associations. The Alliance will develop 
standards based in substantial part on existing “voluntary and contractual 
produce safety standards” and will facilitate information exchange among 
members.76 
C. Racial Discrimination in Juvenile Justice 
Debate about discrimination tends to oscillate between two interpreta-
tions of the meaning of impermissible discrimination—disparate treatment 
and disparate impact. At the extremes, the first interprets discrimination to 
mean only decisions that consciously aim to disadvantage members of a 
protected group; the second interprets it to include all decisions that have 
foreseeably disproportionate and adverse effects on such a group.  
The first is too narrow. It involves severe difficulties of proof when de-
fendants take care to hide their prejudices, it ignores the demonstrated fact 
of unconscious bias, and it is unresponsive to the continuing effects of past, 
conscious discrimination. The second is too broad. Because membership in 
disadvantaged groups correlates with other factors that are legitimate bases 
for decisionmaking, it would often be unfair and impractical to prohibit all 
decisions with foreseeable disparate impacts. 
The disparate treatment approach has been favored by the courts in con-
stitutional equal protection cases.77 However, an approach that is more 
demanding than simple disparate treatment but less demanding than simple 
disparate impact has emerged under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
which prohibits discrimination by recipients of federal grants (which in-
clude most state and local government agencies and private universities and 
hospitals) and Title VII of the same statute, which prohibits discrimination 
by employers. Under this approach, a disparate impact on a protected group 
creates a rebuttable inference of discrimination. Rebuttal requires a demon-
stration of a nondiscriminatory purpose. In the more demanding 
formulations, the decisionmaker must show that there is no reasonably 
available alternative path to the nondiscriminatory goals that would be less 
burdensome on the disadvantaged group.78 In this more demanding formula-
tion, disparate impact analysis converges with the “reasonable 
accommodation” standard introduced in nondiscrimination law concerning 
                                                                                                                      
 76. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA, USDA, Cornell University An-
nounce Alliance for Produce Safety (Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/ 
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm232503.htm.  
 77. See Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273–74 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).  
 78. See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 374, 390–402 
(2007). Our analysis relies extensively on Johnson’s article. 
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the disabled.79 Thus, we see suggestions that antidiscrimination norms 
sometimes can be understood not as defining specific prohibited conduct but 
as requiring that “racial impact [be viewed] as a warning sign that should 
trigger scrutiny of the rationality or fit between means and objectives” of the 
relevant practice.80  
This approach leads discussion away from personal motivation and to-
ward institutional practicalities. And the inquiry into reasonableness and 
alternatives tends to become intensely local. The rights and duties these an-
tidiscrimination norms create can only be defined through a form of 
investigation that will depend on technical and local knowledge. An interest-
ing example is the response to race discrimination in juvenile corrections 
established by 1992 and 2002 amendments to the federal Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention Act (“JJDPA”).81  
Many practices in the criminal justice system have marked disparate  
impacts on minority youth. While 15 percent of all youth are African-
American, 40 percent of youth in confinement are African-American.82 On a 
disparate impact theory, this disparity raises an inference of discrimination. 
On the other hand, there are potential nondiscriminatory explanations that 
might rebut the inference. Race correlates with income, education, employ-
ment, family structure, and other nondiscriminatory factors that may in turn 
correlate with criminal activity. Some studies find substantial disparate im-
pacts after purporting to control for these other factors, but they are 
controversial. Thus, the scope of disparate impact liability is ambiguous, 
and claims tend to be hard to establish.83  
However, Congress took a more proactive approach in the JJDPA. As a 
condition of receiving federal grants, states must make and annually revise a 
plan to “reduce . . . the disproportionate number of juvenile members of 
minority groups, who come into contact with the juvenile justice system.”84 
Each state must submit annual performance reports on its compliance with 
                                                                                                                      
 79. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006); Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, 
Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 Duke L.J. 1, 38–41 (1996) 
(suggesting that “reasonable accommodation” is implicit in discrimination doctrine outside the 
disabilities area). 
 80. Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 
63 Fla. L. Rev. 251, 258 (2011); see also Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, The Miner’s 
Canary 11–14 (2002); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A 
Structural Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458 (2001). 
 81. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act of 2002, Pub. 
L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22) (2006)); Act 
of Nov. 4, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-586, 106 Stat. 4982 (1992) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5633 
(2006)). 
 82. Johnson, supra note 78, at 402–03. 
 83. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidis-
crimination Law, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (2006). 
 84. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22) (2006). 
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its own plan and its progress toward the goal of reducing this disparate im-
pact.85  
The JJDPA plans must identify what in food safety regimes are called 
the “critical control points” in the process that lead to incarceration. As with 
food safety, an important source of uncertainty in juvenile justice is the  
difficulty of pinpointing where in the “supply chain” of separate actors  
sub-optimal practices occur.  
A given juvenile justice case will involve multiple decision points: the ini-
tial delinquency referral from police or other sources; the decision on 
whether to detain (which can be made by intake staff, law enforcement of-
ficials, and the state’s attorneys); referral to prosecution for delinquency or 
for transfer to adult court; and a judicial disposition which may involve re-
turning a child to a community (for community service, informal, or 
formal probation), commitment to a residential facility, or transfer to adult 
court.86  
At each point, JJDPA requires that racial disparities be measured, their 
causes assessed, and mitigating interventions considered.87 As successful 
interventions are identified, information about them is made available, and 
lagging jurisdictions are pressured to consider and try them. 
The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention of the De-
partment of Justice monitors compliance with the program, provides 
technical assistance, and funds demonstration projects. The federal statute 
encourages the formation of state advisory groups, and these groups have 
formed the Coalition for Juvenile Justice to exchange information. A variety 
of foundations, led by the Annie E. Casey Foundation, support peer ex-
changes and experimentation, and advocacy groups, such as the Youth Law 
Center, provide advocacy around disproportionate minority contact 
(“DMC”) issues.88 
Measured by aggregate racial disparity figures, the JJDPA regime in ju-
venile justice has not been a success, but many continue to regard it as the 
most promising framework for reform in this area. The program, Olatunde 
Johnson writes, has “resulted in the development of promising programs and 
                                                                                                                      
 85. Id. § 5633(a).  
 86. Johnson, supra note 78, at 403. Congress took note of this supply chain in 2002, 
when it replaced the focus of the original statute on “disproportionate minority confinement” 
with a focus on “disproportionate minority contacts” within the juvenile justice system. See 42 
U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22).  
 87. 28 C.F.R. 31.303(j) (2011). The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preven-
tion (“OJJDP”) does not normally publish jurisdiction-specific data, but the Heywood W. 
Burns Institute for Juvenile Justice Fairness and Equity has obtained some of this data from 
the OJJDP and published that data on its website. State Map, The Heywood W. Burns In-
stitute for Juvenile Justice Fairness and Equity, http://www.burnsinstitute.org/ 
state_map.php (last visited Jan. 21, 2012).  
 88. See generally Cases, Youth Law Center, http://www.ylc.org/ylcInAction.php 
(last visited Jan. 21, 2012); Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative, The Annie E. Casey 
Foundation, http://www.aecf.org/MajorInitiatives/JuvenileDetentionAlternativesInitiative.aspx  
(last visited Jan. 21, 2012). 
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initiatives some of which have reduced racial disparities in particular states, 
and provided a focal point for advocacy for system improvements by private 
providers and outside advocacy organizations.”89  
An especially promising development is the Juvenile Detention  
Alternatives Initiative (“JDAI”) organized and supported for the past 20 
years by the Casey Foundation. The JDAI includes 110 participating local 
jurisdictions and 27 state jurisdictions. It has developed a model of plan-
ning, self-assessment, and experimentation for juvenile detention generally 
similar in principle to (but more developed than) that required for minority 
disparities by the JJDPA. Most participants appear to have achieved large 
reductions in detention without any adverse impact on public safety.90 The 
extent to which aggregate reductions are specifically attributable to JDAI 
interventions remains to be determined. Juvenile detention decreased in 
most states during the period of JDAI efforts, as did juvenile crime rates.91 
However, the JDAI architecture seems exceptionally well configured to the 
problems it addresses. Monitoring for racial disparities is an integral part of 
the JDAI process. While there has been no aggregate reduction in the dispar-
ities, the JDAI reports some notable local successes. For example, both 
aggregate detention and racial disparities dropped significantly in Santa 
Cruz, California.92 Moreover, there have been important benefits to minori-
                                                                                                                      
 89. Johnson, supra note 78, at 410 (citations omitted). 
 90. Specifically: 
[The 73 sites reporting] had a total average detention population of 5,451 in the year pri-
or to each site joining JDAI and 3,967 in 2007—representing a 27 percent cumulative 
reduction in average daily population as of 2007. Thirty-six of the reporting sites (49 
percent) had total population reductions of 25 percent or more, and those high perform-
ing sites had a median population reduction of 39 percent.  
The Annie E. Casey Found., Two Decades of JDAI: From Demonstration Project to 
National Standard 14 (2009) [hereinafter The Annie E. Casey Found., Two Decades]; 
see also id. at 19 (“[T]here is no evidence that JDAI has led to any increases in offending in 
the short-term while youth who might otherwise be detained are supervised in the communi-
ty.”). See generally Eleanor Hinson Hoytt et al., The Annie E. Casey Found., 
Reducing Racial Disparities in Juvenile Detention: 8 Pathways to Juvenile Deten-
tion Reform (2001), available at http://www.aecf.org/upload/publicationfiles/reducing% 
20racial%20disparities.pdf. For more information, see http://www.jdaihelpdesk.org.  
 91. Jeffrey A. Butts & Douglas N. Evans, John Jay Coll. of Criminal Justice, 
Resolution, Reinvestment, and Realignment: Three Strategies for Changing Ju-
venile Justice 1–2 (2011), available at http://johnjayresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/ 
09/rec20111.pdf. A study by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency of the period 
1994–1998 found that, while juvenile detention decreased in JDAI sites, it increased in four-
teen comparison sites. Nat’l Council on Crime & Delinquency, NCCD Evaluation of JDAI 
(Feb. 2002) (unpublished draft) (on file with authors). There has been no independent assess-
ment of JDAI since then, but one by the Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Law and Social 
Policy at the UC Berkeley School of Law is underway. See Impact Evaluation of the Juvenile 
Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI), Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Law 
and Social Policy, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/11130.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2011). 
 92. Scott MacDonald & Todd Foglesong, The Role of Probation in Reducing Minority 
Youth Confinement: Detention Reform and Justice Development in Santa Cruz County, 1990–
2008 (Oct. 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
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ties in other jurisdictions that are not captured by racial disparity figures. In 
jurisdictions such as Chicago, where minority youth constitute more than 90 
percent of the youth in the criminal justice system, aggregate detention re-
duction largely benefits minority youth, and a focus on racial disparities 
seems futile.93 
JDAI intervention begins with the development of Risk Assessment In-
struments to govern detention decisions. Such instruments are designed to 
give structure and consistency to judgments previously left to inarticulate 
discretion.94 The JDAI protocol for the development of Risk Assessment 
Instruments calls for assembling “stakeholder” representatives, including 
judges, police, probation officers, prosecutors, defense lawyers, schools, 
public health agencies, and community service providers. The process 
strives to neutralize bias of many kinds by forcing precise articulation of 
standards and rigorous evaluation in light of experience. Factors that have 
disparate racial impacts are intensively reviewed, and alternatives are con-
sidered. Some sites have lowered racial disparities without harm to public 
safety by replacing “good family structure” as a counterindication to deten-
tion and instead asking whether there is an adult willing to be responsible 
for the youth’s appearance in court. They have replaced “school attendance” 
with “productive activity” (thereby including employment).95 Portland, Ore-
gon, eliminated consideration of the severity of the offense giving rise to the 
arrest after it found that this consideration had no predictive value.96 Once 
formulated, the Instrument is supposed to be validated by research and reas-
sessed periodically. 
The need for detention depends substantially on the availability of less 
restrictive forms of monitoring. A jurisdiction that fails to develop alterna-
tives will feel forced to detain in situations where a more proactive 
jurisdiction would not. Moreover, the way diversion programs are config-
ured and sited may have an influence on racial disparities. “Much of the 
progress in Santa Cruz[, California,] has been due to a new community-
based detention alternatives program—an evening reporting center—which 
is located in a formerly underserved neighborhood and supervises many 
Latino youth who would have previously been assigned to secure deten-
tion.”97 Home detention monitored by daily visits or electronic devices is 
another commonly used alternative. 
Where particular practices are associated with disproportionate minority 
impact, they should be investigated and reconsidered. In some jurisdictions, 
                                                                                                                      
 93. Hoytt et al., supra note 90, at 38, 50–51, 59–60. 
 94. David Steinhart, The Annie E. Casey Found., Juvenile Detention Risk 
Assessment: A Practice Guide to Juvenile Detention Reform 19 (2006), available at 
http://www.jdaihelpdesk.org/Docs/Documents/Objective%20Admissions%20Criteria% 
20and%20Instruments/Juvenile%20Detention%20Risk%20Assessment/Practice%20Guide%2
0to%20Juvenile%20Detention%20Risk%20Assessment.pdf. 
 95. Hoytt et al., supra note 90, at 57.  
 96. Interview with Richard Jensen, Nat’l. Model Site Adm’r., Multnomah Cnty. Juve-
nile Detention Reform Initiative (Aug. 12, 2011). 
 97. The Annie E. Casey Found., Two Decades, supra note 90, at 23. 
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disproportionate minority detention has been associated with “failure to  
appear” charges when juveniles miss court appointments. Some have re-
sponded with “notification” programs. Agency personnel telephone or, if 
necessary, visit the offenders and their caregivers to remind them of their 
scheduled appearances, and may also assist them in preparing for the ap-
pearance and arranging transportation. A notification program in Pierce 
County, Washington, is credited with raising the appearance rate of minority 
youth from 52 to 91 percent.  
At their most ambitious, reforms are designed to integrate risk assess-
ment and monitoring with coordinated provision of social services. 
Referrals to the juvenile justice system often involve problems that are  
susceptible to professional intervention—for example, drug treatment,  
behavioral therapy such as anger management, or special education. Where 
cross-cultural communication and understanding is difficult, intermediaries 
with experience and credibility in the child’s community may be needed. In 
some localities, a Community Assessment and Referral Center (“CARC”) 
provides these services at the point of entry into the juvenile justice system. 
An example is the Huckleberry CARC in San Francisco, which describes 
itself as “a forum in which staff from juvenile probation, the sheriff’s de-
partment, and community based organizations, work together in the same 
space to form an interdisciplinary team that assess[es] and case manage[s] 
youth who are arrested for a variety of nonviolent offenses.”98 
Assessments of the broader DMC regime are mixed. A salient complaint 
is that federal sanctions are insufficient. Private enforcement is precluded, 
and the Department of Justice, which has enforcement responsibility, prefers 
to use the carrots of technical assistance and demonstration grants to the 
stick of withdrawing federal funds. The Department appears to withhold 
funds only when noncompliance is extreme and obvious.99 Yet, even with 
such limited enforcement, the achievements of the regime—as augmented 
by the efforts of the Casey Foundation—seem substantial, and it seems 
plausible that the most effective approach to the problem of disproportionate 
minority contact would involve a strengthening of the framework rather than 
an alternative to it. 
The regime manifests the key jurisprudential traits we found in the agri-
cultural regimes. Disparate impact doctrine is fundamentally indeterminate. 
At the most abstract level, it is indeterminate because there is no generally 
accepted answer to the question of what nondiscrimination entails in situa-
tions where nonracially motivated action has foreseeably disparate racial 
                                                                                                                      
 98. Huckleberry Community Assessment & Referral Center, Annual  
Report July 1, 2008–June 30, 2009, at 1, http://www.sfgov3.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/ 
juvprobation/meetings/Full_Commission/supporting/2010/03-10-10_Huckleberry_CARC_ 
Update_handout.pdf. Sustained community involvement is promoted and facilitated in some 
areas by the Haywood Burns Institute for Juvenile Justice Fairness and Equity. James Bell et 
al., W. Haywood Burns Inst., The Keeper and the Kept: Reflections on Local Ob-
stacles to Disparities Reduction in Juvenile Justice Systems and a Path to Change 
(2009), available at www.burnsinstitute.org/downloads/BI%20Keeper%20Kept.pdf. 
 99. See Johnson, supra note 78, at 415. 
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impacts. Analysis becomes somewhat more focused if we accept the sugges-
tion that nondiscrimination requires monitoring of racial disparities and the 
adoption of reasonably available means to mitigate them. Yet, this precept 
also is indeterminate because it makes duty a function of practical feasibil-
ity, and we know little about practical feasibility. Thus, as with leafy greens, 
a key response to indeterminacy is the establishment of a regime in which 
meaning can be elaborated through collaborative investigation. 
Such assessment requires the kinds of contextualization observed in 
food safety. Local units should be encouraged to experiment with reforms 
adapted to their own circumstances and to compare their experiences for 
lessons that can be transported from other sites to theirs. At the same time, 
there needs to be coordination across a series of actors in a linked produc-
tion process (schools, police, courts, corrections) in order to identify the 
points at which mitigation is likely to be effective.  
Again as in food safety, there is an emphasis on continuous  
reassessment and adaptation of norms. The JDAI protocol for Risk  
Assessment Instruments, for example, calls for continuous reassessment as 
experience suggests problems and wholesale reconsideration at least every 
four years.100 More broadly, the JDAI experience suggests how collaborative 
deliberation can lead to reconceptualization of problems, as well as new 
solutions. Discrimination that was initially perceived as a problem of either 
conscious or implicit bias in individual detention decisions has come in 
some of the more successful jurisdictions to mean failure to configure ser-
vices and facilities to the circumstances of low-risk minority youth in ways 
that obviate detention.  
The regime also involves a multifarious institutional structure. It started 
as an effort by the federal government to induce self-assessment and self-
correction by the states. However, it acquired an additional institutional  
dimension when a nongovernmental organization (“NGO”)—the Casey 
Foundation—dissatisfied with the federal government’s performance, took 
advantage of the reporting and planning process required by the statute to 
encourage more efforts through technical assistance. 
The DMC regime is an effort to elaborate the legal safeguard of “equal 
protection” and the prohibition of “discrimination on the basis of race.” In 
Pierce County, Washington, this elaboration has led to the practice of home 
visits to remind juveniles of all races of their court appointments. This is not 
a conclusion that could have been reached analytically; nor could it have 
been derived technocratically without the process of local experimentation 
that led to it. Once evidence of a practice’s efficacy is available, it becomes 
plausible to say that nondiscrimination requires a comparably situated juris-
diction to either adopt the reform or provide a good reason for not doing so. 
Before we have the evidence, the best interpretation of nondiscrimination is 
as a duty to participate in the process of self-assessment and collaborative 
inquiry constituted by the contextualizing regime. 
                                                                                                                      
 100. Steinhart, supra note 94, at 68–69. 
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D. The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission and the  
Dolphin Conservation Program 
Tuna commonly school beneath swimming dolphins in the eastern tropi-
cal Pacific Ocean. Because these schools are relatively large and because the 
dolphins are readily spotted on the surface, “dolphin sets” are an effective 
way to catch tuna. Fishing boats use dolphin sightings to identify the 
schools and then encircle the schools with nets. The dolphins have no com-
mercial value, but without special effort, fishers kill large numbers of them 
in the process.101 
Harm to dolphins from tuna fishing first became a public issue in the late 
1960s, and in 1972, Congress passed the Marine Mammal Protection Act. 
The statute mandated that marine mammal populations be managed to main-
tain an “optimum sustainable population” and banned the taking of 
mammals from “depleted” stocks.102 It further declared an “immediate goal” 
to reduce dolphin mortality and serious injury from tuna fishing to “insignif-
icant levels approaching a zero . . . rate.”103  
The term “optimum sustainable population” has no definition either in 
the statute or in science,104 and the duty to reduce mortality from tuna fish-
ing to “insignificant levels” is also ambiguous in several respects: What is 
“insignificant”? How quickly does the reduction have to occur? How should 
cost or technical feasibility be considered? Moreover, at the time the statute 
was enacted, there was little data on dolphin population size or mortality 
rates from tuna fishing.  
The ambiguity in the statutory terms remains, and the data deficiency 
has been rectified only partially. Yet Richard Parker, on whose account we 
rely here, calls the regime that eventually emerged from this effort “one of 
the most innovative and effective environmental regimes in the world.”105 It 
reduced dolphin mortality from tuna fishing by over 99 percent.106 On Par-
ker’s account, the success of the regime is due to the discovery of 
surprisingly inexpensive ways to reduce dolphin harm coupled with indirect 
but potent pressure on fishers to adopt them. No technocratic analysis could 
have mandated this result directly because the relevant facts were unknown 
prior to the intervention. Both discovery and implementation of the harm-
reducing practices depended on the creation of a contextualizing regime. 
Soon after its enactment, the National Marine Fisheries Service imple-
mented the statute by imposing technology-based “gear and practice” 
                                                                                                                      
 101. See generally Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect 
the Global Commons: What We Can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 Geo. Int’l 
Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 11–17 (1999). 
 102. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361(2), 1362(1)(A), 1371(a)(3)(B) (2006). See generally Marine 
Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361–1423h (2006). 
 103. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2). 
 104. Tim Gerrodette & Douglas P. DeMaster, Quantitative Determination of Optimum 
Sustainable Population, 6 Marine Mammal Sci. 1, 1–2 (1990). 
 105. Parker, supra note 101, at 6.  
 106. Id. 
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standards on U.S. boats and requiring them to accept monitors on board. 
Dolphin mortality from U.S. tuna fishing fell dramatically from an estimated 
300,000 dolphins per year to 15,000.107 But the decline partly reflected the 
shrinking of the U.S. fleet in the eastern tropical Pacific under consumer 
pressures for “dolphin-safe” tuna, which has been defined as tuna caught 
without any encirclement of dolphins. When U.S. processors demanded tuna 
they could label “dolphin-safe,” U.S. boats dispersed to other areas where 
tuna can be caught more easily without setting on dolphins. 
As U.S. boats left, they were replaced by foreign ones, and both NGOs 
and the remaining U.S. fishers concerned about dolphins focused attention 
on foreign boats.108 Prior to 1984, U.S. efforts to induce foreign conserva-
tion were ineffectual. In that year, Congress amended the statute to require 
the Secretaries of State and Commerce to seek an international agreement 
and to embargo imports of tuna from the eastern tropical Pacific from any 
country that lacked a regulatory program and a fleet mortality rate “compa-
rable” to those of the U.S.109 
By this time, the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (“IATTC”) 
had begun to address the problem.110 IATTC is an intergovernmental organi-
zation of coastal and fishing countries established to manage the eastern 
Pacific tuna fishery, and in particular, to guard against depletion through 
overfishing. The commissioners are appointed by each member state, and 
they make decisions by consensus. IATTC had begun a dolphin conserva-
tion initiative that included placing observers on boats to document 
mortality and study fishing techniques, a research program on gear and prac-
tices to mitigate harm, and an outreach program to disseminate information. 
Participation was voluntary, but the 1984 U.S. statute gave non-U.S. mem-
bers incentive to cooperate because cooperation demonstrated that their 
efforts were “comparable” to those of the United States. 
The IATTC program very soon produced some “startling” infor-
mation.111 First, dolphin mortality was considerably higher than the industry 
had ever acknowledged. But second, mortality was highly correlated with 
specific practices—for example, misaligned gear, fishing after sundown, 
failure to adequately deploy crew to assist dolphins out of the net—that 
could be avoided with fairly modest training and effort. The observers doc-
umented wide variance in the performance of different boats. IATTC staff 
“estimated that total mortality could be reduced by 80% simply by getting 
the mortality rates of the worst captains down to the level of the best.”112 
The organization set up “a fleet-wide clearinghouse of information on  
                                                                                                                      
 107. Id. at 19. 
 108. Id. at 29. 
 109. Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Act, Pub. L. No. 98-364, 98 Stat. 440 (1984) 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (2006)). 
 110. See generally Parker, supra note 101, at 21–25 (describing the creation and func-
tioning of the IATTC). 
 111. Id. at 24. 
 112. Id. at 31. 
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dolphin mortality reduction gear, techniques, and experience.”113 Mortality 
rates dropped dramatically.114 And industry opposition to mandatory limits 
softened as fishers saw that the costs of mitigating the problem were far 
lower than they had assumed.115 
Although participation in the IATTC program could establish that a flag 
state had a protective regime “comparable” to the United States, foreign 
boats, despite dramatic progress, lagged behind U.S. ones and thus could 
not establish the “comparable” mortality rates also required by statute. In 
1991, the United States embargoed tuna from most of the foreign-flag 
states.116 At about the same time, consumer boycotts succeeded in inducing 
some major processors to commit to buy only “dolphin-safe” tuna.  
“Dolphin-safe” initially meant caught without any deliberate encircle-
ment of dolphins (and for many, it still does). But during the embargo and 
the boycott, information emerged that suggested a trade-off among ecologi-
cal goals. The techniques for catching tuna that do not deliberately encircle 
dolphins pose a much greater threat to the sustainability of tuna because 
they trap many more immature tuna. They also kill a significantly larger 
number of other species, including sea turtles and sharks.117 Some environ-
mentalists joined IATTC in arguing that a focus on reducing injuries from 
dolphin sets was preferable to an outright ban on these sets. 
In 1992 and 1995, the United States entered into dolphin conservation 
agreements with other flag states.118 The agreements committed the parties 
to “progressively reduce dolphin mortality [to] levels approaching zero,” 
while at the same time limiting the bycatch of juvenile tuna and nontarget 
species.119 The parties agreed to establish, through IATTC, annual fleet-wide 
mortality limits no higher than 19,500 in 1993 and declining to below 5,000 
by 1999. (In addition, fleet-wide morality could not exceed 0.2 percent of 
the dolphin population as estimated by the National Marine Fisheries Ser-
vice; after 2000, this limit was to decline to 0.1 percent.) This fleet-wide 
limit would be apportioned into per-vessel limits among boats licensed by 
the member states under IATTC-approved procedures. IATTC would pro-
vide required training for captains and continue research on mitigation 
techniques. Every boat would require an observer, and at least half of the 
                                                                                                                      
 113. Id. at 29.  
 114. Id. at 52 n.235. 
 115. Id. at 27–29. 
 116. Id. at 33–34. 
 117. Betsy Carpenter, What Price Dolphin?, U.S. News & World Rep., June 13, 1994, 
at 71. Apparently, the differential effect on immature tuna and other species is due to the facts 
that dolphin sets induce the tuna to move faster prior to netting and the junior tuna and other 
species don’t keep up with the adult tuna. Id. A World Trade Organization panel found that 
harm to dolphins may also occur in sets that do not involve deliberate encirclement. Panel 
Report, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna 
and Tuna Products, ¶ 7.531, WT/DS381/R (Sept. 15, 2011), at 248 [hereinafter WTO Panel 
Report]. 
 118. Parker, supra note 101, at 47–53. 
 119. Id. at 47–48, 53–54. 
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observers would have to be agents of IATTC. A “tracking system” would 
allow the tracing of particular tuna to particular vessels and sets. To monitor 
implementation, the agreements provided for an Implementation Review 
Panel within IATTC consisting of five delegates of signatory governments, 
two industry representatives, and two NGO representatives.120  
Congress implemented the agreements in 1997 amendments to the Ma-
rine Mammal Protection Act. The amendments permit imports of tuna from 
nations that participate in the IATTC dolphin conservation program, comply 
with program norms, and in particular, meet relevant mortality limits.121 
Regulations for U.S. vessels, in addition to specifically incorporating stand-
ards developed by IATTC (for example, no sets after sundown, no use of 
explosives), require the vessels to accept observers from IATTC or other 
recognized organizations and to apply to IATTC and abide by vessel-
specific mortality limits.122  
Some environmental groups continue to protest any pursuit of dolphins 
and insist that the label “dolphin-safe” be restricted to tuna caught without 
deliberate encirclement. Others would prefer a labeling regime less focused 
on a single species. Although its import rules support the IATTC regime, 
U.S. labeling requirements make the no-encirclement position a condition of 
the “dolphin-safe” label, thus imposing a significant market penalty on tuna 
from the eastern Pacific.123 Most tuna caught under the IATTC regime is 
thus marketed outside the United States. A recent decision by the World 
Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body held that the U.S. refusal to 
allow use of a “dolphin-safe” label for IATTC-compliant tuna violated the 
                                                                                                                      
 120. See generally id. at 47–58. 
 121. International Dolphin Conservation Program Act, Pub. L. No. 105–42, 111 Stat. 
1122, 1123–24 (1997) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (2006)).  
 122. 50 C.F.R. § 216.24 (2011). 
 123. Id. § 216.91(a)(2)(i). IATTC favors a definition of “dolphin-safe” as tuna caught in 
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the matter, that encirclement did not have a “significant adverse effect on any depleted dolphin 
stock.” See id. at 1061–62. The evidence turned out to be inconclusive. Despite lower mortali-
ty, dolphin stocks did not recover in the years immediately following the conservation 
program. It was a matter of controversy whether failure was due to nonfatal harm from tuna 
fishing or some undetected ecological change. See id. at 1062–63. Despite this uncertainty, the 
Secretary sought to move to the “no observed mortality” definition, but the courts reversed his 
decision in litigation brought by environmental groups. See id. at 1071; Taking of Marine 
Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations: Tuna Purse Seine Vessels in the East-
ern Tropical Pacific (ETP), 69 Fed. Reg. 55288–89 (Sept. 13, 2004); Paul R. Wade et al., 
Depletion of Spotted and Spinner Dolphins in the Eastern Tropical Pacific: Modeling Hypoth-
eses for their Lack of Recovery, 343 Marine Ecology Progress Series, Aug. 7, 2007, at 1, 
12. More recent data suggest that stocks may be recovering. Tim Gerrodette et al., Nat’l 
Ocean & Atmospheric Admin., Estimates of 2006 Dolphin Abundance in the Eastern 
Tropical Pacific (2008) (technical memorandum). 
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Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.124 If upheld on appeal, the ruling 
would require the United States to change its labeling policy or suffer trade 
sanctions.125  
As with our other cases, the problem of dolphin protection arises along a 
production chain, and interventions at multiple points are potentially effec-
tive. However, here two U.S. interventions—trade rules that incorporate 
IATTC norms for fishers and labeling rules for processers—are in some ten-
sion, and the regime is not as well articulated as it could be. Nevertheless, 
although the U.S. labeling rule currently reduces incentives to comply with 
the IATTC norms, the regime has remained stable so far. 
Given its declared goals, the IATTC-based conservation program ap-
pears to have been successful. Reported dolphin mortality in 2008 was 
1,168—well below the 5,000 maximum of the agreement. The rate of mor-
tality per set, which varied between 6 and 13 in the mid-1980s and was 1.5 
in 1992 and 0.45 in 1995, was 0.13 in 2008.126 “[T]he salient facts,” Parker 
concludes, “are that the Program established ambitious, verifiable, and envi-
ronmentally defensible goals for environmental performance—goals, in fact, 
that had eluded the best performing national program in previous years—
and achieved those goals.”127 
The jurisprudential traits that we have noted in earlier regimes recur in 
Tuna–Dolphin. Here again is a case in which indeterminate legal terms, 
such as “optimum sustainable population,” are resolved through deliberation 
and experimentation rather than interpretation or policy engineering.  
We also see important contextualization. Here is a regulatory regime tai-
lored for a problem associated with a specific industry, a specific species, 
and a specific body of water.  
Adaptation is again an important theme. While he suggests that congres-
sional pressure was critical to the construction of the regime, Parker finds 
that highly directive legislative intervention proved counterproductive be-
cause it failed to anticipate important contingencies.128 For example, the 
legislative demand that foreign fleets match U.S. mortality rates in the early 
1990s proved arbitrary and unworkable. After most of the U.S. fleet had left 
the region, U.S. rates were set by the performances of very few boats, which 
were likely to fluctuate widely over time. And the “no-encirclement” policy 
of the NGOs and the government encouraged practices with the surprising 
and, to some, unacceptable consequence of harming tuna sustainability. 
                                                                                                                      
 124. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 117, at 206–63. 
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The case also shows that the need to adapt extends to reassessment of 
ends as well as means. The discovery of a trade-off between the goals of 
dolphin conservation and tuna sustainability required some stakeholders to 
reconsider their goals. Most of them had initially understood their goal as 
minimizing harm to dolphins, and the “no-encirclement” policy had reflect-
ed this understanding. But when the trade-off was discovered, some NGOs 
decided that they should be concerned with the sustainability of tuna as 
well, and five major environmental groups embraced the IATTC program as 
a reasonable compromise within what they saw as a more complicated set of 
goals.129 
Finally, we again find a multifarious institutional structure, this time 
complicated by international dimensions. The key actor—the IATTC—is 
formally an intergovernmental organization, but it reflects strong industry 
influence. It interacts with national regulatory authorities, especially the 
U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service. At the same time, although NGOs 
have only a small formal role within the IATTC (with two representatives on 
the Implementation Review Panel and a few representatives at Commission 
meetings acting as “observers”), they have had great practical influence 
through legislative lobbying and consumer-oriented publicity.  
From the U.S. regulatory perspective, the tuna–dolphin story is an effort 
to implement the statutory norm of maintaining “optimum sustainable popu-
lation[s]”130 of dolphins and achieving “insignificant levels” of mortality.131 
These terms could not have been elaborated very far analytically, and any 
effort to implement them technocratically in a command-and-control fash-
ion would have been impeded by limited understanding, not only of the 
causes of the problem, but also of how the problem should be defined.  
III. The Structure of Contextualizing Regimes 
The Leafy Green Marketing Agreement started through private initiative, 
the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative was built on a federal statute, 
and the Dolphin Conservation Program was undertaken by a treaty-based 
international organization. These examples do not exhaust the possible ori-
gins of contextualizing regimes. They sometimes arise through judicial or 
agency initiative. For example, in areas such as education and child protec-
tive services, courts have responded to allegations of systemic misconduct 
by officials by inducing and overseeing the formation of regimes designed 
to make their agencies more effective, transparent, and accountable to 
stakeholders.132 Kenneth Bamberger and Deirdre Mulligan recently recount-
ed the critical role of the Federal Trade Commission in promoting a 
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 130.  16 U.S.C. § 1361(2) (2006). 
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stakeholder regime that has developed a very skimpy and ambiguous set of 
statutory texts about data privacy into a nuanced body of learning and prac-
tice.133 
Institutional origin does not appear to be a strong determinant of ulti-
mate structure. Regardless of its origins, each of the regimes just mentioned 
has common structural features. We begin by contrasting the open and 
amorphous structure of these newer regimes with those portrayed in the 
trade association literature. We then discuss some basic internal-process 
norms common to most contextualizing regimes. Finally, we take account of 
the means available to generalist lawmakers to induce and influence contex-
tualizing regimes. 
A. From Closed to Open Structure 
Our key examples—the Leafy Greens Marketing Handlers Agreement, 
the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative, and the Tuna–Dolphin  
Conservation Program—are distinguished by their vague boundaries and 
shifting and heterogeneous memberships. In these qualities they are typical 
of regimes that address uncertainty through ongoing collaborative inquiry 
and deliberation. We call such regimes “experimentalist.” 
Such regimes differ from the trade associations that have been promi-
nent in recent scholarship and which are primarily concerned with codifying 
established practices and values.134 The main goal of such codification re-
gimes is to facilitate bilateral exchange, most often of commodities on spot 
markets. They proceed through promulgating standardized definitions of 
contract terms and maintaining arbitration processes. At least in the best-
known American versions, they rely on formally promulgated rules, rather 
than tacit understanding. However, these rules are closely configured to cus-
tomary practice and tend to be stable. Noncompliance is typically a matter 
of either inattention or opportunism, and optimal sanctions tend to be a 
combination of moderate monetary penalties and informal social pressures 
mobilized through publicizing noncompliance. The central institutions are 
usually mutual-benefit nonprofit corporations with clearly defined member-
ships limited to industry participants. 
The PACA regime described by Hart and Sacks in the cantaloupes case 
differs from these trade association regimes in that it arose from and de-
pends on public intervention. But in other respects, it is more of a 
codification regime than an experimentalist one. It is concerned with bilat-
eral exchange in commodity markets, operates through promulgating 
standard terms and maintaining arbitration services, sanctions with a  
combination of moderate penalties and informal shaming, and it has a well-
bounded institutional structure. The cantaloupes case illustrates that private 
initiative is not always sufficient to create such regimes, but it also shows 
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that public intervention need not alter the basic function and structure of this 
type of regime. 
Our three newer regimes are quite different. They are not focused on bi-
lateral exchange. And they deal in products—safe food, nondiscriminatory 
public services, and “dolphin-safe” tuna—where compliance cannot be veri-
fied by inspection at the point of delivery. Rather, compliance depends on 
activities at various points in a multiactor supply chain. Specifications thus 
embrace not just the product but also the extended production process. (The 
only reliable way to ensure that leafy greens are safe or that tuna was caught 
without harm to dolphins is to assess the production process; the only relia-
ble way to ensure that racial disparities in juvenile detention are 
nondiscriminatory is to look at the process that leads to detention.) Moreo-
ver, since both the understanding of the problems and the means of 
mitigating them are changing, compliance assessment is typically coupled 
with investigation and experiment. Norms tend to be more provisional and 
fluid than they are in codification regimes. And the structure of sanctions 
tends to be different. While noncompliance in codification regimes is asso-
ciated with inattention or opportunism, noncompliance in experimentalist 
regimes often seems as likely to result from ignorance or incapacity.135 Thus, 
initial responses to deviance are likely to take the form of technical assis-
tance, required planning and training, and increased monitoring. Sanctions 
are harsher for persistent violators, but the harshest sanctions often take the 
form not of monetary penalties but of expulsion from membership or denial 
of certification, as in LGMA and IATTC. 
Institutional structures tend to be more complex and amorphous. LGMA 
is closest to the traditional trade association organizational structure, and 
perhaps even closer to PACA, since its rules are promulgated by public 
regulators and enforced by government inspectors. But it has a close relation 
to university-based agricultural research that is expected to generate rapidly 
evolving standards. Moreover, its own success has been a factor influencing 
the creation of a national regulatory regime in the Food Safety Moderniza-
tion Act of 2010, and it will in all probability soon be playing an important 
role in the emerging public system. 
The regime that has developed around discrimination in juvenile justice 
has been similarly polymorphous. As conceived by Congress, the Depart-
ment of Justice was expected to play the strongest facilitative and 
monitoring role. Anticipating that the Department’s efforts would be insuffi-
cient, the Annie E. Casey Foundation brought many states and localities 
together to form a parallel network. And when some thought the Casey 
Foundation was insufficiently focused on racial disparities (as opposed to 
excessive detention in general), the Heywood Burns Foundation established 
yet another network that both complements and competes with the Depart-
ment of Justice and the Casey Foundation. And as we noted above, a full 
description of the regime would have to include many local NGOs that  
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develop detention alternatives and configure social services in ways de-
signed to obviate detention. 
In the international sphere, organizational forms are still more complex 
and ambiguously bounded. IATTC is formally an intergovernmental organi-
zation with a well-defined membership of nation-states. But the key 1992 
international agreement that established vessel-specific mortality limits was 
negotiated by NGOs.136 Moreover, IATTC is strongly responsive to industry 
representatives, and it has lately acknowledged the influence of NGOs by 
admitting them as observers. And the international organization is in contin-
ual interaction with national domestic agencies that implement import and 
labeling rules. 
B. Internal Process Norms for Contextual Regimes 
The forms contextualizing regimes take are diverse, and so are their rela-
tions to public authority. But all of them are subject to legally enforceable 
duties of procedural fairness, and all of them typically have strong incen-
tives to respect some norms of procedural fairness regardless of their formal 
enforceability. 
Formally, we can distinguish three categories of regime. In the first—
exemplified by the trade association regimes—the central actors are mem-
bership organizations that formulate standards that purport to bind only their 
own members. Here the standards acquire force by virtue of the members’ 
contractual commitments, with expulsion from the organization as the most 
severe sanction. Internal procedural norms are in the first instance a matter 
of contract, though background common-law norms may insist on some 
basic due process.137  
In the second model, the organization promulgates standards intended to 
apply to nonmembers as well as members. Absent contractual assent, these 
standards can acquire legal force against nonmembers only if adopted by a 
public authority.138 Here the key enforceable process constraints will be con-
stitutional and statutory norms that apply to the public process of adoption.  
Then, there is a large intermediate category in which the distinctions be-
tween member and nonmember and public and private are blurred. 
Standards may not be formally binding on nonmembers but may acquire 
economic compulsion, for example, by becoming the de facto standard in a 
market with network externalities. Or membership, while nominally volun-
tary, may become a de facto requirement for participation in some markets. 
Alternatively, the public process by which private standards get incorporated 
may be so perfunctory and automatic that the most important practical op-
portunities for deliberation occur in the nominally private process. In this 
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intermediate realm, antitrust laws will frequently impose process require-
ments.139 
In our examples, the Casey Foundation’s Juvenile Detention Alternatives 
Initiative looks like the first category, where voluntary contract is doing 
most of the formal legal work. IATTC is formally an intergovernmental or-
ganization, but it has some resemblance to the second category, since its 
dolphin conservation standards acquire force by virtue of incorporation by 
national governments as conditions of trade privileges. LGMA is still harder 
to classify. Within the United States it enforces norms only against its mem-
bers (even though state agents play a major role in enforcement), but 
Canada and Mexico incorporate LGMA standards as conditions of trade 
privileges, and within the United States, it may have the kind of de facto 
market dominance that characterizes the third category. 
Regardless of formal legal requirements, most regimes feel strong pres-
sure to demonstrate commitment to procedural fairness. Even organizations 
that only regulate their own members are often concerned about convincing 
the public of the adequacy of their self-regulatory efforts in order to forestall 
more costly public interventions. While the norms are not as specified as is 
customary in trade associations and governmental agencies, they tend to 
reflect a fairly consistent set of themes. 
The main themes are these: 
1. Transparency. Virtually all contextualizing regimes recognize trans-
parency requirements greater than those that would apply to purely private 
proprietary organizations. Standards must generally be publicly accessible if 
they are to have binding legal force against people who have not agreed to 
abide by them. Fair process requires notice of standards before punitive en-
forcement, and standards that are not publicly accessible cannot be used as 
evidence of negligence or due care (except sometimes against someone who 
has adopted them).140 Incorporation of standards in law limits the ability of 
the developer to claim intellectual property rights in them (though how 
much is a matter of dispute.)141 
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A separate set of issues has to do with disclosure of performance or 
compliance data.142 Public disclosure of such data facilitates rewarding of 
frontrunners and shaming of laggards. But it also raises the stakes in as-
sessment and creates incentives for those who fear they might lag to 
withdraw (if participation is optional) or to hide or manipulate data. Differ-
ent regimes trade off these considerations in different ways. 
Federal regulators disclose individual performance ratings for nursing 
homes and hospitals.143 However, the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention discloses only aggregate data on DMC perfor-
mance.144 Another approach found in nuclear power regulation is to publicly 
disclose aggregate industry data and detailed information on serious harm, 
but to limit disclosure of routine individual performance data to members of 
the regime.145 The LGMA and IATTC take this route. The premise is that 
intra-industry disclosure will generate soft reputational pressures to improve 
and facilitate the discovery of best practices by making clear who the front-
runners are. Wider disclosure is resisted on the ground that public reaction 
may be arbitrary and discourage candid reporting. 
2. Inclusion. Contextualizing regimes tend to espouse principles of in-
clusiveness. An important expression of the principle is the “Essential 
Requirements” of the American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”). 
ANSI and its international affiliate, the International Organization for 
Standardization (“ISO”), certify standards as “consensus standards.” Certifi-
cation confers no direct legal force, but it is a credential that many potential 
public adopters find persuasive. The ANSI Essential Requirements proclaim 
that “[p]articipation shall be open to all persons who are directly and mate-
rially affected by the activity in question.”146 ANSI requires a notice-and-
comment procedure through which anyone can submit views that the  
standard-setters are obliged to consider. It also requires some “balance” in 
the standard-setting body. For product standards, balance requires represen-
tation of both producers and users of the product, and may require 
representatives of labor, professional societies, or government agencies.  
Presumptively, no single “interest category” should constitute more than 
one-half (or in the case of safety standards, one-third) of the decisionmaking 
body.147 
                                                                                                                      
 142. See generally Mary Graham, Democracy by Disclosure (2002). 
 143. See Nursing Home Compare, Medicare.gov, http://www.medicare.gov/nhcompare 
(last visited Jan. 21, 2012).  
 144. See National Disproportionate Minority Contact Databook, Office of Juvenile 
Justice & Deliquency Prevention, http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/dmcdb/index.html. 
 145. Joseph Rees, Hostages of Each Other 94–96, 104–05, 118–20 (1996). 
 146. Am. Nat’l Standards Inst., supra note 140, § 1.1. 
 147. Id. §§ 1.1–1.3, 2.1–2.3. The one-half or one-third standard is described as a “histor-
ical” benchmark used as a “normative policy.” Id. §§ 2.1, 2.0. A related principle at the 
international level is the trade law doctrine that holds that a nation sometimes may not enforce 
a regulation with strong trade-restrictive effects unless it has first engaged exporting nations in 
an effort to find a mutually acceptable arrangement. See Robert Howse, The Appellate Body 
Sabel & Simon FTP4 B.doc 3/22/2012 9:47 AM 
May 2012] Contextualizing Regimes 39 
As a practical matter, most standard-setting tends to be dominated by 
industry, professional groups, or government officials (though there is often 
significant diversity of views within and among these categories).148 Formal-
ly, LGMA is an industry body, and IATTC is constituted by government 
representatives, although the LGMA board has one “public” member, and 
IATTC admits environmental NGO representatives as “observers” to its 
meetings. On the other hand, since the effectiveness of the standards pro-
duced by each depends on approval or incorporation in public lawmaking 
process, each has incentives to respond to diverse concerns. The JDAI re-
gime we have described is an interesting alternative. Formally, the 
Department of Justice is the dominant player, but the Annie E. Casey Foun-
dation, a private NGO concerned with social policy toward children, has 
constructed a parallel network with itself at the center that has proven quite 
effective, and may ultimately prompt the Department of Justice to raise its 
mandatory requirements. 
3. Fair decisionmaking process. Contextualizing regimes tend to de-
scribe their decisionmaking in self-consciously vague and aspirational 
terms, such as “consensus.” Consensus implies agreement reached through 
good faith, principled discussion. This aspiration is supplemented by three 
types of norms that can often be enforced by appeal both within and outside 
the organization. 
The first type is the notice-and-comment procedure we have just men-
tioned. The second involves voting rules. The ideal form of consensus is 
unanimity, and a unanimous vote is sometimes required, especially in inter-
national organizations. IATTC requires unanimity.149 However, unanimity 
often cannot be achieved (and even when it can, it may involve tacit coer-
cion or compromise). LGMA provides for decision at the board level by 
majority vote. When “neither scientific studies nor authoritative bodies 
ha[ve] allowed for suitable metrics,” LGMA tries to adopt norms supported 
by “consensus among industry representatives and/or other stakeholders.”150 
The most common voting rule for standard-setting organizations is probably 
a supermajority one. Organizations who want to convince outsiders that 
their standards are “consensus” or “generally accepted” will feel pressure to 
show supermajority support for them.151 
The third type of fair-process rule is designed to prohibit opportunism. 
For example, standards regulate such matters as the distribution and form of 
ballots, quorums, and record-keeping. They require disclosure of important 
conflicts of interest. And there are general residual prohibitions of  
                                                                                                                      
Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment 
Debate, 27 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 491, 504–11 (2002). 
 148. Ross E. Cheit, Setting Safety Standards 176–79 (1990). 
 149. Inter-Am. Tropical Tuna Comm’n, Rules of Procedure, r. IV; available at 
www.IATTC.org/PDFFiles/Rules%20of%20ProceduresENG.pdf (last updated Aug. 22, 2011). 
 150. Food Safety Guidelines, supra note 62, at 9. 
 151. ANSI requires a vote that provides “evidence of consensus” and suggests that a 
two-thirds vote (with a quorum of at least half of the membership) is an “example” of such 
evidence. Am. Nat’l Standards Inst., supra note 140, § 2.7. 
Sabel & Simon FTP4 B.doc 3/22/2012 9:47 AM 
40 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 110:ppp 
opportunistic manipulation. An important example of the latter is the role of 
the Sherman Act in policing standard-setting organizations with monopoly 
power. A landmark case is Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, 
Inc., which involved a proposed revision of a National Fire Protection Asso-
ciation standard that would have permitted plastic, as well as metal, 
conduit.152 A maker of metal conduit sought to thwart the revision by  
packing the Association meeting with new members it had recruited for this 
purpose. The Supreme Court held that such conduct could incur antitrust 
liability.153  
4. Continuous Self-Assessment. Hart and Sacks saw that custom played a 
vital “filling-in function” with respect to legal indeterminacy, but they were 
troubled by it, in part because of the tendency of custom to lag behind tech-
nological and economic change. They suggested that courts should be 
prepared to overrule custom where the judge could determine that its norms 
were obsolete or inefficient.154 A key difference between the norms of  
experimentalist regimes and the kind of customary norms Hart and Sacks 
ambivalently appealed to is that the norms of contextualizing regimes are 
explicit and subject to frequent reassessment.  
ANSI requires, as a condition of accreditation, that standard-setting or-
ganizations engage in “[c]ontinuous maintenance” of their standards, which 
it defines as “consideration of recommended changes . . . according to a 
documented schedule.”155 Our three exemplary regimes set more demanding 
conditions for themselves. They mandate not only response to proposed 
changes but also detailed monitoring and recording of experience and proac-
tive reconsideration of norms in light of this experience.156 
C. Mechanisms by Which Generalist Lawmakers  
Induce, Facilitate, and Monitor Contextualizing Regimes 
The jurisprudence of contextualizing regimes includes a distinctive set 
of interventions by which generalist public authorities induce and influence 
such regimes. These interventions tend to take one of four general forms: 
                                                                                                                      
 152. 486 U.S. 492 (1988). 
 153. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 509–10; see also Dell Computers, Inc., 121 F.T.C. 616 
(1996) (adopting the same posture in an FTC proceeding). 
 154. Thus, in “The Case of the Unworthy Tugs,” they approve of the court’s refusal to 
enforce an industry custom where it reliably determined that “a calling . . . [had] unduly 
lagged in the adoption of new and available devices.” Hart & Sacks, supra note 28, at 403–
15 (internal quotation marks omitted). In “The Case of the Bankers Accustomed to Doing 
What They Pleased,” they approve of the court’s disregard of an industry custom where it 
determined that the defendant had invoked the custom opportunistically to frustrate the plain-
tiff’s reasonable expectations. Id. at 415–34. 
 155. Am. Nat’l Standards Inst., supra note 140, § 4.7.2. 
 156. Courts have occasionally treated duties to monitor and reassess implementation as 
implicit in substantive statutory norms. See, e.g., R.C. ex rel. The Ala. Disabilities Advocacy 
Program v. Walley, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (terminating an injunction against 
child welfare officials after concluding that monitoring and reassessment procedures were 
adequate). This case is also discussed in Noonan et al., supra note 132, at 549–51. 
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encouragement and subsidization, immunity, incorporation and enforce-
ment, and direct regulation. 
1. Encouragement and Subsidization. The optimal level of organization 
around a public problem will not routinely occur spontaneously, but some-
times a small amount of public initiative or support can produce big gains. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) induced the creation of the 
American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors by organizing and funding 
meetings. The Food and Drug Administration encourages agricultural trade 
associations to produce production guidelines by bringing them together and 
publicizing the results of their deliberations. The Department of Justice 
funds meetings and specific experiments under the “disproportionate mi-
nority contacts” program under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Act. An incrementally more coercive form of encouragement is 
the conditioning of some independent benefit on the development of partici-
pation in a contextualizing regime. For example, the FBI gave a boost to the 
accreditation regime of the ASCLD by limiting access to its DNA database 
to accredited labs.157  
2. Immunity. Contextualizing regimes in markets for private goods and 
services have a complex relationship with competition. Ideally, they sup-
press undesirable competition—“races to the bottom”—where there are 
externalities or where consumers do not make reliable choices (notably, with 
respect to health and safety). And they can also enhance competition by 
generating standards that facilitate comparison of products (“U.S. No. 1 
cantaloupes”) or that facilitate interoperability among products. However, 
even when standardization promotes competition, it does so only along 
some dimensions by taking others out of competition. We have a very com-
petitive market in electrical appliances in part because standardization has 
eliminated competition in building outlet configuration.  
Because contextualizing regimes can limit desirable as well as undesira-
ble competition, they raise antitrust concerns, and their activities often come 
within the language of the basic antitrust prohibition of “combinations in 
restraint of trade.” Thus, antitrust immunity is an enabling condition of some 
regimes. A variety of statutes confer immunity on specific regimes, and the 
courts have construed the Sherman Act to impliedly exempt a range of bene-
ficial collaborative standard-setting and information-sharing activities.158 
The California Marketing Act under which the state’s Leafy Green Market-
ing Agreement is organized,159 and its federal analog, under which the 
national regime has been proposed,160 are examples of specific exemptions. 
3. Incorporation. Public authorities can influence contextualizing re-
gimes by giving legal effect to their normative output. We have emphasized 
                                                                                                                      
 157. Nat’l Research Council, supra note 17, at 197. 
 158. See Christopher L. Sagers, Antitrust Immunity and Standard Setting Organizations: 
A Case Study in the Public-Private Distinction, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1393 (2004). 
 159. California Marketing Act, Cal. Food & Agric. Code §§ 58601–59293 (West, 
Westlaw through Ch. 745 of 2011 Reg. Sess. and all 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess.). 
 160. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1621–1638d (2006). 
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that public authorities look to standards developed by these regimes to  
resolve indeterminacies in publicly enacted or declared law. The prospect of 
such adoption or incorporation can influence stakeholder conduct within the 
regimes in a variety of ways. 
The norms of contextualizing regimes can be incorporated in private 
agreements and enforced by courts and agencies as contracts. This happens 
with the Leafy Green standards. They can also be incorporated into common 
law tort duties or into regulations. “Generally accepted” industry standards 
have long been given weight in determining duties in tort. Since 1998, an 
Office of Management and Budget Circular has required federal agencies to 
“use voluntary consensus standards in lieu of government-unique standards 
in their procurement and regulatory activities, except where inconsistent 
with law or otherwise impractical.”161 Statutes and regulations give at least 
presumptive force to standards, such as those of the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board.162 Eligibility conditions of government programs incorpo-
rate standards of contextualizing regimes. For example, to receive payments 
under Medicaid and other healthcare programs, hospitals must comply with 
the standards of the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare 
Standards.163  
International trade privileges are often linked to the norms of contextual-
izing regimes. We saw that Canada and Mexico will admit fruits and 
vegetables from California only if certified under the Leafy Green Market-
ing Agreement. The Tuna–Dolphin regime evolved in response to trade 
pressures, and participation in the IATTC conservation regime is a condition 
for export to the United States.164 
The WTO Sanitary Phytosanitary Agreement, which applies to food 
safety regulations among others, requires that national regulations that have 
trade-restrictive effects be “based on” international standards unless availa-
ble standards are demonstrably inadequate for the regulatory purpose.165 
4. Direct regulation. Subsidy, immunity, and incorporation influence re-
gime design by conditioning benefits on compliance with procedural norms. 
For example, a standard developed in a process that blatantly excluded im-
portant stakeholder views could not qualify as a “consensus standard” under 
the OMB Circular that regulators incorporate such norms where feasible. 
Lawmakers can also enforce such norms directly. They can do so by taking 
charge of such regimes. For example, in “negotiated rulemaking,” the gov-
                                                                                                                      
 161. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Circular A-119 Revised (1998), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a119. 
 162. Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Statement of Policy on the Establish-
ment and Improvement of Accounting Principles and Standards, Accounting Series 
Release No. 150 (Dec. 20, 1973), available at 1973 WL 149263. 
 163. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(f) (2006). 
 164. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2006). 
 165. WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 3, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493. 
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ernment convenes an inclusive stakeholder group and orchestrates its delib-
erations in accordance with specified procedures.166  
The government can also direct the processes of private regimes, and it 
commonly does so with respect to regimes that acquire monopoly power 
over important economic interests and activities. As it acquires economic 
power, a private regime acquires public duties under the antitrust laws. 
Members who suffer economic injury from arbitrary exclusion may obtain 
damages or injunctive relief. So may competitors sometimes sue for harm 
from standards adopted through manipulation of the regime’s processes for 
the benefit of parochial interests.167 
When public or private regimes manifestly and persistently fail to meet 
applicable standards—either their own or others that can plausibly be ap-
plied to them—courts or agencies often intervene to force restructuring. 
Three categories of such intervention are especially important. First, insol-
vency and bankruptcy law. When business enterprises become insolvent, 
courts create a process for liquidation or reorganization of the enterprise in 
the interests of and under the supervision of often diverse creditor constitu-
encies. Second, deferred prosecution agreements. When corporations are 
caught in systemic or large-scale unlawful activity, they may be able to 
avoid the potentially catastrophic consequences of corporate criminal  
conviction by agreeing to a restructuring. The restructuring is designed to 
safeguard against the recurrence of unlawful activity. It typically involves 
prolonged supervision by an outside monitor and periodic reports to the 
prosecutor.168 Third, “public law litigation”—civil rights cases in which 
courts, on finding continuing systemic failure to meet basic obligations, 
oversee the restructuring of the organization’s processes.169 In each of these 
three categories, the tendency of intervention is to increase transparency and 
broaden participation of affected constituencies.  
Judicial practice in these restructuring cases illustrates the basic Hart 
and Sacks insight that indeterminacy arises from discontinuity of right and 
remedy. The court is able to determine that the regime or organization is in 
violation of its obligations, but it is unable to specify substantively what 
remedy follows from that determination. It is thus led to induce or re-
configure a regime to bring about more effective deliberative elaboration of 
the relevant standards. 
                                                                                                                      
 166. Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–70a (2006). 
 167. See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988); 
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Conclusion 
Contextualizing regimes start out with very general norms coupled with 
specific requirements or implicit inducements for stakeholders to collabora-
tively deliberate and investigate how they apply in specific circumstances. 
They are then elaborated in the course of this deliberation and investigation. 
The range of problems that the legal system addresses through contextualiz-
ing regimes is growing, and the structure of the regimes that address some 
of the most important problems is changing. This new structure is more 
multifarious and less clearly bounded than the structures associated with 
regimes dominated by trade associations or administrative agencies. 
